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Article 
Conscience in Commerce: Conceptualizing 
Discrimination in Public Accommodations 
AMY J. SEPINWALL 
According to much current law and theory, a public accommodation that offers a 
good or service to one customer cannot refuse to provide that same good or service to 
another patron simply because of the latter’s identity. Thus, in many jurisdictions, 
reception hall owners must rent their spaces to both a Black Baptist Church and the 
Christian Identity KKK, wedding vendors must sell their goods to a marrying couple no 
matter the sex of the couple’s members, and foster parent agencies must serve same- and 
opposite-sex parenting duos alike. Call the principle underpinning this policy the 
“Equal Access” principle: The principle holds that a vendor can choose the products 
he sells but not the customers he serves; equally, a public service agency can choose its 
portfolio but not its patrons. The principle lies at the core of recent cases in which 
religion and sexual orientation, or religion and gender identity, have clashed in public 
accommodations, and it is pervasive among commentators who seek to ensure that the 
retail sphere—whether commercial or charitable—remains a discrimination-free zone. 
This Article champions the egalitarian spirit of Equal Access, but it argues that the 
principle itself is unworkable, unreliable, and perhaps even incoherent. Equal Access 
permits impermissible discrimination and forbids refusals of service that in fact promote 
equality’s ends. Further, Equal Access derives support from a problematic conception 
of the retail sphere—one that sees commerce as amoral and so cannot even make sense 
of a vendor’s interest in exercising their conscience at work.   
In place of this morally neutered conception, this Article aims to vindicate a picture 
of the marketplace as richly moral. And in place of Equal Access, this Article aims to 
offer a more principled and nuanced account of when and why retail discrimination is 
impermissible. That account would forbid identity-based discrimination but permit 
refusals of service for projects that foster hate toward protected groups, even where the 
hate-based project is intimately linked to a protected characteristic (as with religious 
groups that mandate white supremacy). Far from perpetuating discrimination, these 
refusals instead promote anti-discrimination norms, and they help realize the vision of 
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Conscience in Commerce: Conceptualizing 
Discrimination in Public Accommodations 
AMY J. SEPINWALL * 
INTRODUCTION 
No one should be denied service at a place of public accommodation 
because of who they are. Patrons should not be kicked out of Starbucks 
because they are Black,1 couples should not be denied landscape gardening 
services because they are gay,2 transgender people should not be removed 
from restaurants for using the restroom corresponding to their gender 
identity;3 and a parent should not be denied the opportunity to foster a child 
because they happen to be married to someone of the same sex.4 
The prevailing approach to preventing discrimination of this kind 
imposes a categorical ban on refusing service to anyone. As Justice Elena 
Kagan has stated, “[a] vendor can choose the products he sells, but not the 
 
* J.D., Ph.D. (Philosophy). Associate Professor, Legal Studies and Business Ethics, The Wharton 
School, University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful to audiences at Princeton, UCLA, Duke, St. John’s, 
and the University of Pennsylvania, as well as the Annual Law and Religion Roundtable, for helpful 
questions and comments on this draft, and at Yale for reactions to an earlier related paper. I also extend 
special gratitude to Nicolas Cornell, Chris Lund, Larry Sager, Elizabeth Sepper, Seana Shiffrin, Amanda 
Shanor, Andy Siegel, Joseph Singer, Nelson Tebbe, and David Velleman for very helpful exchanges and 
suggestions. Autumn Dunn provided excellent research assistance. 
1 Anna Orso, One Year Later: A Timeline of Controversy and Progress Since the Starbucks Arrests 
Seen ’round the World, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/starbucks-
incident-philadelphia-racial-bias-one-year-anniversary-stutter-dilworth-park-homeless-tables-
20190412.html. 
2 Gay Couple in Georgia Denied Service by Landscaper: “I Always Turn Them Down”, GA. 
UNITES AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, https://georgiaunites.org/gay-couple-in-georgia-denied-service-by-
landscaper-i-always-turn-them-down/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2020); Rhuaridh Marr, Atlanta Landscaper 
Refused to Work for Gay Couple Due to Their "Perverse" Marriage, METRO WKLY. (Aug. 13, 2018), 
https://www.metroweekly.com/2018/08/atlanta-landscaper-refused-to-work-for-gay-couple-due-to-
their-perverse-marriage/. 
3 Justin Wm. Moyer, D.C. Restaurant Fined $7,000 After Asking Transgender Woman for ID 
Before Letting Her Use Bathroom,  WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2019, 5:12 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-news/dc-restaurant-fined-7000-after-asking-transgender-
woman-for-id-before-letting-her-use-bathroom/2019/01/17/00d1fc6e-1a86-11e9-afe1-
7bd2532c9988_story.html. Cf. Branson LB, I Got Kicked Out of a YMCA Locker Room—Twice—
Because I’m Trans, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 30, 2018, 11:11 AM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/arti
cle/bransonlb/i-got-kicked-out-of-a-ymca-locker-room-twice-because-im. (detailing the author’s 
exclusion from a YMCA locker room without consequences). 
4 This is the question at the heart of a case pending before the Supreme Court, Fulton v. City of 
Philadelphia, No. 19-123, which I discuss below. See infra text accompanying notes 117–19, as well as 
Section III.B.  
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customers he serves—no matter the reason.”5 Commentators adopt the same 
absolutist policy, maintaining, for example, that one who “puts out a sign” 
or holds himself out to the public as a place of public accommodation open 
for customers is bound to accept everyone.6 The policy has been decisive in 
ruling against wedding vendors in all but one of the cases where the vendors 
have sought exemptions from anti-discrimination laws in their bids to deny 
service to same-sex couples.7 And it stands to play a role in the Supreme 
Court’s pending decision in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, in which Catholic 
Social Services seeks an exemption from Philadelphia’s law prohibiting 
discrimination in public accommodations.8 
While a categorical approach has worthy egalitarian aims, it threatens to 
rule out conscientious refusals of service that should evoke our sympathy, 
and perhaps even our support. Consider the restaurateur who announced, in 
the wake of the Orlando nightclub shootings, that owners of assault rifles 
were not welcome at her establishments;9 or the owner of the Red Hen 
restaurant, who ejected Sarah Huckabee Sanders, former press secretary for 
President Trump, because Sanders had defended the President’s policy of 
 
5 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1733 n.* (2018) (Kagan, J., 
concurring). See also Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 282 (Colo. App. 2015) 
(explaining that a store may not “refuse services to Craig and Mullins that it otherwise offers to the 
general public”). 
6 Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 
90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1410 (1996) [hereinafter Singer, No Right]. See also Steven J. Heyman, A 
Struggle for Recognition: The Controversy over Religious Liberty, Civil Rights, and Same-Sex Marriage, 
14 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 88 (2015) (“[A]n enterprise that offers to serve the public becomes part of 
the social realm of commerce. Such an enterprise properly can be regarded as a place of public 
accommodation with a duty to serve everyone.”). Other prominent scholars have approvingly cited 
Singer’s “holding out” conception. Singer, No Right, supra at 1410. See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Religion 
and Marriage Equality Statutes, 9 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 25, 52–58 (2015); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The 
Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1225 
(2014); Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Religious Exemptions and Antidiscrimination Law in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 128 YALE L.J.F. 201, 213 n. 53 (2018); Elizabeth Sepper, Religious Exemptions, 
Harm to Others, and the Indeterminacy of a Common Law Baseline, 106 KY. L.J. 661, 666–67 (2018). 
See also infra note 173 and accompanying text (collecting other sources and tracing the history of the position).  
7 See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 
132, 133 n.2 (2018) (collecting cases on denial of service to same-sex couples). Wedding vendors have 
prevailed in only one case thus far, involving a business that produces custom-made wedding invitations. 
See, e.g., Daniel Avery, Outrage After Court Says Wedding Invitation Makers Can Refuse Gay Couples: 
‘A License to Discriminate’, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 17, 2019, 9:49 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/arizona-
wedding-invitation-gagy-supreme-court-1459627. For an overview of public accommodations statutes, 
see infra notes 39 & 74. 
8 See Brief for City Respondents at 2, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, No. 19-123 (Aug. 13, 2020) 
(“[CSS] has insisted that the Constitution entitles it to . . . perform government services . . . while 
disregarding a contractual obligation that every other foster family care agency must follow.”).  
9 See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Restaurant Owner Spurns Those Who Are O.K. With AR-15s, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/02/us/think-ar-15s-are-ok-this-restaurant-
owner-doesnt-want-your-business.html. For a similar effort, consider In SEO, an internet company 
whose owner announced that the company would no longer do business with any Trump supporters. See 
Eugene Volokh, Opinion, Can Businesses Refuse to Serve—or Employ—Trump Supporters?, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 25, 2016, 8:23 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/1
1/25/can-businesses-refuse-to-serve-or-employ-trump-supporters/.  
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separating immigrant children from their parents;10 or the high-powered 
corporations that refused to do business in North Carolina after it passed its 
infamous “bathroom bill.”11 Egalitarians should condemn the baker who 
refuses to provide a cake for a same-sex wedding.12 But what about a 
different baker who refuses to provide a cake for a religiously-mandated 
marriage between a middle-aged man and a non-consenting teenage girl?13 
And while we should insist on people’s right to wear “Black Lives Matter” 
shirts,14 what about similar pressure to protect the rights of those who want 
to wear white supremacist paraphernalia?15 
There are distinctions to be made in the foregoing cases—ones that 
would prohibit identity-based discrimination while also protecting 
businesses’ rights to deny their products to individuals or groups promoting 
oppression or hate.16 The problem that this Article seeks to address is that 
the two main approaches in law and theory to preventing discrimination 
cannot yield these distinctions. Instead, these approaches issue a blanket 
prohibition on turning patrons away, thereby requiring, for example, that one 
serve the Black rights advocate and Christian Identity KKK member alike.17 
 
10 Avi Selk & Sarah Murray, The Owner of the Red Hen Explains Why She Asked Sarah Huckabee 
Sanders to Leave, WASH. POST (June 25, 2018, 5:24 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local
/wp/2018/06/23/why-a-small-town-restaurant-owner-asked-sarah-huckabee-sanders-to-leave-and-
would-do-it-again/. 
11 Emery P. Dalesio & Jonathan Drew, AP Exclusive: 'Bathroom Bill' to Cost North Carolina 
$3.76B, AP NEWS (Mar. 30, 2017), https://apnews.com/e6c7a15d2e16452c8dcbc2756fd67b44/AP-
Exclusive:-'Bathroom-bill'-to-cost-North-Carolina-$3.76B.  
12 Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1720 (2018); Klein v. Or. Bureau 
Lab. & Indus., 139 S. Ct. 2713, 2713 (2019); Cf. State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1209 
(Wash. 2019) (answering the Supreme Court’s question posed by Klein—whether the Washington Courts 
violated the Constitution’s guaranty of religious neutrality—in the negative); Elane Photography, LLC 
v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 62 (N.M. 2013) (citing to the Supreme Court’s decisions declining to adopt a 
distinction between status and conduct for refusing to serve same-sex couples). 
13 One might think such things happen only in dystopian fiction. See, e.g., MARGARET ATWOOD, 
THE TESTAMENTS 387 (2019) (portraying religiously motivated marriages between a middle-aged man 
and a non-consenting teenage girl). But in fact these marriages are legal in all but three states. See, e.g., 
Julie Zauzmer, Some Religious Groups Allow Courtship of Underage Girls, DURANGO HERALD (Nov. 
18, 2017, 6:18 AM), https://durangoherald.com/articles/195498 (discussing the prevalence of the legality 
of such marriages). I elaborate on the laws around underage marriage in what follows. See infra notes 
154–57 & 182–84. 
14 In 2016, Savannah police were called to eject four Black individuals quietly sitting through 
services at the Bible Baptist Church wearing Black Lives Matters (BLM) T-shirts, in silent protest of the 
church’s decision to fire a daycare worker for wearing a BLM shirt to work. Beatrice DuPuy, Black Lives 
Matter Member Plans to Sue Georgia Church for Discrimination After It Banned Group, NEWSWEEK 
(Nov. 16, 2017, 6:42 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/black-lives-matter-members-kicked-out-church-
713892. 
15 Restaurant Violated Rights of Swastika Wearers, Judge Rules, AP NEWS (Mar. 11, 1988), 
https://apnews.com/72b0d6ccf7eed17f12b015df835fc60e. 
16 I identify this as the key distinction and advance an account of permissible refusals of service on 
this basis, in Part III, infra. 
17 See, e.g., Fighting for White Rights for Over 140 Years, WHITE CAMELIA KNIGHTS OF THE KU 
KLUX KLAN, http://www.wckkkk.org/identity.html (last visited July 29, 2020) (describing what it means 
to be a “Christian Identity Klan” and drawing upon biblical support for the KKK’s (purported) white 
supremacy). Cf. Fox v. Washington, 949 F.3d 270 (6th Cir. 2020) (reversing and remanding a district 
court decision holding that a prison that refused to provide Christian Identity inmates with a space free of 
“non-white” inmates for their worship did not violate Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act). 
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Or, as Douglas Laycock approvingly writes, “The same public accommodations 
law that prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation also 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion . . . [even if the] religious 
belief and practice is extreme and offensive.”18  
The first of these blanket approaches denies that a business owner has 
any reason to care about the identity of their customers or the projects to 
which they will put the business’s goods. The approach might be captured 
in the adage pecunia non olet (“money does not smell/taint”).19 On this view, 
market transactions are inherently amoral, so vendors cannot be complicit in 
the uses to which customers put their goods or services.20 As such, it can 
never be immoral to provide service; it can only be immoral to deny it.  
To see that conceiving of the market as amoral is potentially perverse, 
return to the example of the non-consensual, but religiously dictated, 
underage marriage. If you bake a wedding cake in your home that you gift 
to the couple, then you have troublingly endorsed the marriage. Earn money 
from selling a cake for that same marriage at your bakeshop and you have 
not; after all, the thinking goes, it is just business.  
The second approach is ecumenical about the role of conscience in the 
market but strictly egalitarian as regards individual customers. On this 
approach, a store may not sell a particular good to one person and then refuse 
to sell that same good to a different person.21 Or again a public service 
agency may not offer a particular service (e.g., foster placement) to one set 
of clients but not another, at least where the only difference between the two 
 
18 Douglas Laycock, The Wedding-Vendor Cases, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 55 (2018). 
19 See, e.g., Tim Worstall, Pecunia Non Olet, FORBES (July 27, 2011, 9:48 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2011/07/27/pecunia-non-olet/#e7edcc412737 (using the 
phrase pecunia non olet to question the rejection of money from a questionable source); Ruben George 
Oliven, The Money Rhetoric in the United States, in ECONOMIC PERSUASIONS 167 (Steven Gudeman, 
ed., 2009) (discussing the American proverb “[m]oney doesn’t smell”); Carly Silver, ‘Pecunia Non Olet’: 
How a Roman Emperor Revived the Government with a Urine Tax, ALL THAT’S INTERESTING (July 2, 
2019), https://allthatsinteresting.com/pecunia-nonolet. 
20 This conception of business was decisive in the lower courts in the Affordable Care Act 
contraceptive mandate challenges. See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t 
of Health & Hum. Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom; Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (concluding that secular corporations do not have the 
same right to free exercise of religion that churches do). It is also a fixture in commentary seeking to 
protect individual rights to service in the retail sphere. See, e.g., supra note 6; infra Section I.B.  
21 This was just Justice Kagan’s thought in Masterpiece. See Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. C.R. 
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1733–34 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring) (criticizing the baker’s decision to 
not serve a cake that they would have served another couple). Or, as Justice Gorsuch put the operating 
principle, “the fact that [the baker] would make [a particular wedding cake] for some means he must 
make [that cake] for all.” Id. at 1737–38 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). It is worth noting that it was on this 
very ground that Colorado had ruled against the baker in Masterpiece, ordering him to provide “same-
sex couples . . . any product [he] would sell to heterosexual couples.” Id. at 1726 (internal citations 
omitted). See also id. at 1750 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The fact that [the baker] might sell other cakes 
and cookies to gay and lesbian customers was irrelevant. . . . What matters is that [he] would not provide 
a good or service to a same-sex couple that he would provide to a heterosexual couple.”). For theorists 
who support Equal Access, see supra note 6 and infra notes 70–72. 
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tracks an identity-based characteristic.22 Call this approach “Equal Access.” 
Proponents of Equal Access imagine that it can be adequately protective of 
conscience since it allows store owners to determine the goods they sell. As 
such, the law cannot, for example, compel a baker to produce a cake with a 
biblical message decrying homosexuality for a religious patron if the baker 
would not produce any cake with a message decrying homosexuality for a 
secular patron.23 But this approach is not nearly as discerning as one might 
hope. For it would also compel the baker to sell his wares for a KKK 
banquet, just as it would have required PayPal to continue transacting with 
North Carolina businesses notwithstanding PayPal’s opposition to that 
state’s “bathroom bill,”24 since PayPal was presumably not boycotting states 
with more liberal bathroom policies. So too Equal Access would forbid 
foster agencies from excluding families who oppose homosexuality on 
religious grounds, no matter the sexual orientation of the foster child.25 
Worse still, Equal Access may in fact permit instances of discrimination 
that should be impermissible—in particular, those where the excluded party 
has no relevant counterpart. For example, if a restaurant requires every 
patron to use the bathroom corresponding to the sex they were assigned at 
birth, to whom can transgender patrons point to establish their unequal 
treatment? This problem becomes acute in the case of custom-made 
products. If a vendor’s products are highly unique, then the vendor never 
makes the same product twice. As such, he can completely evade Equal 
Access. No wonder the key businesses seeking to deny service to same-sex 
couples offer highly customizable wares—floral arrangements,26 
photography services,27 wedding invitations,28 and wedding cakes.29 And in 
the highly fact-sensitive context of foster family certification,30 a similar 
 
22 This is just how the Respondents in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia characterize the nature of the 
discrimination that CSS would enact. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 78, Fulton v. City of 
Philadelphia, No. 19–123 (Nov. 4, 2020) (Neal Katyal arguing) (“Basically, CSS has said they will not 
permit LGBT couples to be part of their screening process. So, if you're a married gay couple, . . . the 
doors are closed to you, but not to a -- not to a heterosexual couple.”). 
23 William Jack, a fundamentalist Christian customer who was turned away by a baker, sought a 
cake with a message communicating animus toward gays and lesbians. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 
S. Ct. at 1719, 1732. The cake in the Masterpiece case, by contrast, did not convey a message whose aim 
was to denigrate religion. The couple wanted a cake celebrating their marriage. Id. at 1724. I elaborate 
on the distinction between the two cake commissions below. See infra Section II.A. 
24‘Bathroom Bill’ to Cost North Carolina $3.76 Billion, CNBC (Mar. 27, 2017, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/27/bathroom-bill-to-cost-north-carolina-376-billion.html. 
25 See infra note 200 and accompanying text. 
26 State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203 (Wash. 2019).  
27 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 62 (N.M. 2013). 
28 Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 F.3d 890 (Ariz. 2019). 
29 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018); Klein v. Or. 
Bureau Lab. & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051 (Or. App. 2017), cert. granted, judgment vacated.  But cf. Gifford 
v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422, 429 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (denying wedding venue owner’s religious 
freedom challenge to New York’s public accommodations law). 
30 See infra Section III.B. 
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problem arises: no two families are alike so again the discriminating agency 
can never be accused of failing to treat likes alike. 
Commentators have contributed to a burgeoning, although still 
relatively new,31 literature about whether religious freedom or freedom of 
expression confers a right upon a business to be exempt from anti-
discrimination norms.32 This Article critiques the conceptualization of the 
norms themselves. I argue that the categorical approach, enshrined in Equal 
Access, relies on an unappealing vision of the retail sphere, and it yields 
results that frustrate egalitarian aims. Insofar as Equal Access is the bedrock 
of public accommodations laws, those laws stand in need of a new 
foundation, which is just what this Article aims to provide. 
In Part I, I lay bare the conceptual underpinnings of Equal Access—
namely, a view of commerce as amoral and complicity-free. This is the first 
strategy for ensuring access for all: if it is all just business, then vendors have 
no reason to care about who buys their wares and for what ends. Further, one 
sees this commitment to amorality not only in the profane realm of the 
market but even in the eleemosynary space of public services, where a 
consumerist orientation has taken hold, as I shall argue. In response to this 
view, I contend that we need not eschew morality in the marketplace in order 
to block exemptions from anti-discrimination laws. 
In Part II, I turn to the second strategy for ensuring Equal Access—
enforcement of the principle itself. I aim to show that Equal Access not only 
compels vendors to contribute to projects they have reason to oppose, it also 
exposes customers with protected characteristics to the very discrimination 
that it is supposed to prevent. 
Part III offers an alternative to Equal Access. There, I advance a policy 
for public accommodations that can secure equality while also 
accommodating some vendor claims of conscience. In particular, I focus on 
cases where a would-be customer seeks the vendor’s goods or services for a 
project involving hate or oppression. I argue that the vendor need not lend 
herself or her work to such projects, and I suggest that one might, on this 
ground, distinguish between a religious business owner’s refusal to provide, 
say, wedding cakes to LGBTQ patrons (impermissible, on the account 
 
31 See Elizabeth Sepper & Deborah Dinner, Sex in Public, 129 YALE L.J. 78, 85 n.22 (2019) (noting 
“state public accommodations law has received far less attention from legal scholars until recently”).  
32 See, e.g., NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE 115, 138 (2017). For 
more on conscientious refusals to serve same-sex couples, see Andrew Koppelman, A Free Speech 
Response to the Gay Rights/Religious Liberty Conflict, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1125 (2016); Steven J. 
Heyman, A Struggle for Recognition: The Controversy over Religious Liberty, Civil Rights, and Same-
Sex Marriage, 14 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1 (2015); Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience 
Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015); 
Stephanie H. Barclay & Mark L. Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or As-Applied Challenges? A Defense 
of Religious Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1595 (2018); Amanda Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, 
93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 318 (2018); Angela C. Carmella, When Businesses Refuse to Serve for Religious 
Reasons: Drawing Lines Between “Participation” and “Endorsement” in Claims of Moral Complicity, 
69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1593 (2017); Kyle C. Velte, All Fall Down: A Comprehensive Approach to 
Defeating the Religious Right’s Challenges to Antidiscrimination Statutes, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2016). 
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advanced here) and the secular business owner’s refusal to provide a 
religious customer with a cake (even a generic cake) that they will serve at 
an event decrying homosexuality (permissible). 
Part IV aims to buttress the positive account against a possible objection: 
because the account would have the state permit discrimination against 
particular viewpoints, one might worry about state action. For example, if 
the state compels a printer to produce leaflets for a NAACP event but not 
for a Christian KKK event, is the state impermissibly discriminating on the 
basis of race or impermissibly promoting some viewpoints while thwarting 
others? Part IV is devoted to establishing that there is no state action here. 
The final part concludes. 
I. MORALITY IN THE MARKET 
“Complicit” was named the word of the year for 2017,33 which fittingly 
ended with oral argument in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado.34 In that 
case, the Court confronted the question of whether retail owners enjoy a 
so-called right to discriminate on conscientious grounds.35 While the Court 
declined to answer that question, it nonetheless hinted at a resolution.36 The 
Court acknowledged “religious and philosophical objections to gay 
marriage” but contended that in general, “such objections do not allow 
business owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny 
protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and 
generally applicable public accommodations law.”37 The Court has 
 
33 Amy B. Wang, ‘Complicit’ is the 2017 Word of the Year, According to Dictionary.com, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 27, 2017, 5:53 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2017/11/27/ 
complicit-is-the-2017-word-of-the-year-according-to-dictionary-com/.  
34 Transcript of Oral Argument, Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2017) (No. 16-111) (indicating that 
oral argument was heard in December 2017). 
35 Christopher W. Schmidt, Yes, There Is a Right to Discriminate, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2017, 6:00 
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/12/05/yes-there-is-a-right-to-
discriminate/; Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Is There a Constitutional Right for a Business to Not 
Serve Customers?, ABA J. (Nov. 30, 2017, 8:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/is_ther
e_a_constitutional_right_for_a_business_to_not_serve_customers. 
36 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727. While the Court seemed to lean against a policy that would grant 
exemptions from public accommodations laws, id., it nonetheless found in favor of the store owner on 
the narrow ground that he had not received a fair hearing in the courts below. The Court clearly remains 
loath to weigh in on these issues, remanding two subsequent wedding vendor cases to ensure they were 
not infected by the religious bias the Court had found in Masterpiece. See Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. 
Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (remanding the case to the Supreme Court of Washington); Klein v. 
Or. Bureau Lab. & Indus., 139 S. Ct. 2713 (2019) (remanding case to the Court of Appeals of Oregon).  
37 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727. The Court allowed that there might be a narrow range of cases 
in which the law could not compel a vendor’s service—viz., those in which the good or service sought 
involved speech. See id. at 1723 (“If a baker refused to design a special cake with words or images 
celebrating the marriage—for instance, a cake showing words with religious meaning—that might be 
different from a refusal to sell any cake at all.”). I argue elsewhere that the distinction between expressive 
and non-expressive goods and services is misbegotten. Amy J. Sepinwall, Free Speech and Off-Label 
Rights, 54 GA. L. REV. 463, 473 (2020). 
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prohibited race-based denials of service on precisely this ground,38 and all 
state public accommodations laws, as well as Title II of the Civil Rights Act, 
do so as well.39 
The Court’s skepticism about conscientious exemptions from public 
accommodations laws finds an echo in scholarship. Commentators keen to 
prohibit discrimination argue that it matters little whether the store owner 
bears the kind of connection that would, outside of the marketplace, render 
him complicit in his customers’ projects, for the marketplace is a 
conscience-free zone.40  One engages in market transactions with one and 
only one principle: self-interest, narrowly construed.41 Beyond a very basic 
set of moral rules aimed at ensuring property rights and fair play, morality 
has no place.42 The market is instead “[t]he archetype of the profane.”43 
Relying on this conception, Colorado argued in Masterpiece that freedom of 
expressive association, which does permit some discrimination in non-profit 
 
38 Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 408 (1968). Cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 
U.S. 369, 378–79 (1967) (holding that a state constitutional amendment authorizing discrimination in 
housing on any basis is not merely private action; instead, it involves the state in such a way as to make 
the amendment a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
39 In general, Title II of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex, 
religion, or national origin in restaurants, hotels, gas stations, and places of entertainment. 42 U.S.C. § 
2000a. But Title II does not protect against LGBTQ discrimination. Id. Cf. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. 
Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 274, 287 (2010) 
(“Same-sex couples have no federal constitutional right to be free from discrimination, based on sexual 
orientation, in the non-governmental provision of goods and services.”) (footnote omitted). Nor does 
Title II apply to retail establishments like bakeries, flower shops, and clothing stores.  42 U.S.C. § 2000a; 
Joseph William Singer, We Don’t Serve Your Kind Here: Public Accommodations and the Mark of 
Sodom, 95 B.U. L. REV. 929, 936 (2015) [hereinafter Singer, Sodom]. By contrast, about half of the states 
include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in their public accommodations laws. Id. at 943. 
Further, many states have adopted more capacious understandings of what constitutes a public 
accommodation, applying their anti-discrimination provisions not only to businesses plausibly connected 
to interstate travel and commerce (paradigmatically, hotels and restaurants) but to all retail 
establishments. For critical overviews of public accommodations laws, see generally Nancy Leong & 
Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 
105 GEO. L.J. 1271 (2017). For information regarding LGBTQ protections in particular, see Elizabeth 
Sepper, The Role of Religion in State Public Accommodations Laws, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 631, 639 n.25 
(2016). For an authoritative history of protections against sex-based discrimination in public 
accommodations, see Sepper & Dinner, supra note 31. 
40 See infra Section I.B. 
41 See infra note 65. Cf. C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. 
L.J. 981, 985 (2009) (“[A] firm has no freedom except to adopt ever more profitable techniques.”). 
42 See, e.g., Shirley Woodward, Debt to Society: A Communitarian Approach to Criminal Antiprofit 
Laws, 85 GEO. L.J. 455, 486 (1996) (“The market is an amoral venue that provides rewards and 
incentives independently of the moral worth of the activity involved.”). For a description of the market 
that draws out these features, see Eric W. Orts & Amy J. Sepinwall, Collective Goods and the Court: A 
Theory of Constitutional Commodification, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 637 (2020). 
43 Marjorie M. Shultz, Questioning Commodification, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1841, 1855 (1997) 
(reviewing MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN SEX, 
CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS (1996)).  
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organizations,44 is of no avail for “clearly commercial entities.”45 Moreover, 
the notion of an amoral marketplace informs not just the retail sphere but 
also an adjacent one—namely, the sphere of public services, especially when 
carried out by private entities.46 
This Part aims to show that commerce does not have the neutralizing 
effects that courts and commentators impute to it. To that end, I address in 
turn two ways commentators understand the market’s morality-washing. 
Some commentators deny that providing goods or services to a customer 
renders the vendor complicit in the project where the good or service will be 
used.47 Others argue that the marketplace is not an arena where conscience 
may take hold.48 So the vendor is not complicit either because he is not 
connected to the customer’s project in the right way or because market 
transactions immunize him from what would otherwise be an implicating 
connection. Both of these strategies are wrongheaded. The first 
misconceives complicity and the second misconceives the market. I address 
each of them in turn. 
A. Complicity in the Commercial Sphere 
Conscience-based complicity claims are claims to be released from a 
law that one opposes on religious or moral grounds.49 But why should 
government confer “a private right to ignore [a] generally applicable 
 
44 See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. V. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648–49 (2000) (applying this principle to 
the Boy Scouts of America); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. Of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 
563 (1995) (applying this principle to the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council). See Singer, 
Sodom, supra note 39, at 939 (“Freedom of association is a bedrock constitutional principle but it is not 
a basis for claiming a right to establish market structures that are premised on invidious discrimination.”). 
45 Brief for Respondent Colo. C.R. Comm’n at 31, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dale, 530 U.S. at 657). 
See also Brief for Respondents Charlie Craig and David Mullins at 14–15, Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. 1719 
(2018) (No. 16-111) (detailing the Court’s historic refusal to allow retail entities to discriminate, no 
matter the source of the discriminatory motive (religion, freedom of association, etc.)). Cf. Kendrick & 
Schwartzman, supra note 7, at 134 (implying that the “questions about the scope of civil rights laws and 
the limits of First Amendment rights” that the wedding vendor cases raise have a special valence when 
the protesting parties are “for-profit businesses”). 
46 See Clare Kindall, Symposium: The First Amendment Does Not Require Governments to Contract 
with Parties Who Do Not Comply with Neutral, Generally Applicable Rules, SCOTUSBLOG (OC. 29, 
2020, 12:50 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/10/symposium-the-first-amendment-does-not-
require-governments-to-contract-with-parties-who-do-not-comply-with-neutral-generally-applicable-
rules/ (arguing that, in Fulton, “[t]he state is not regulating; it is participating in the market for a particular 
service.”)  
47 See infra Section I.A. 
48 See infra Section I.B. 
49 Melissa Murray has recently argued that there is more than a bid to protect conscience at work in 
the wedding vendors’ complicity claims. She sees in them as well a bid “to reassert and enforce traditional 
sexual mores that the state no longer enforces.” Melissa Murray, Consequential Sex: #MeToo, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, and Private Sexual Regulation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 825, 832 (2018). I believe 
that she accurately diagnoses the motives of particular wedding vendors. But I also allow that at least 
some wedding vendors genuinely care only about protecting their own souls, with no further political 
ends. My analysis contemplates only them. 
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law[]”?50 Why defer to conscience at all? And if we are going to defer in 
some cases, which criteria should we use to identify the appropriate ones? 
Exemption opponents tend to operate with an objective conception of 
complicity, according to which complicity assessments are the prerogative 
of those who judge, not those who would bear the worrying connection.51 
What matters then is whether the community would view a person as 
implicated in someone else’s wrong, not whether the person would so view 
themselves. As Michael Dorf puts it: “The Constitution does not protect 
people from feeling complicit in what they regard as evil.”52  
It is easy to see why, on an objective conception, one would deny that 
store owners are complicit in their customers’ projects. When we judge 
others, we rightfully require some kind of culpable connection to a wrong in 
order to find them complicit in that wrong.53 In particular, we typically 
require that they participate in the wrong, or help choose it, or belong to the 
group on whose behalf it was performed.54  
But the store owner who worries about his complicity in his customer’s 
projects bears none of these connections to those projects. For example, a 
vendor who bakes a cake for a wedding does not participate in the marriage, 
have a role in the couple’s decision to marry, or even belong to a group that 
can be said to be represented in the couple’s union. John Corvino puts the 
point pithily when he writes, “people recognize that baking a wedding cake 
 
50 Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885– 86 (1990). Or, in the more florid words of Brian Leiter, 
allowing for exemption on conscientious grounds “would appear to amount to a legalization of anarchy!” 
—especially if, as Leiter believes, secular claims of conscience warrant no less respect than religious 
ones. BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 91 (2012).  
51 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2798 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that, in assessing complicity claims, the Court must “distinguish[ ] between ‘factual 
allegations that [plaintiffs’] beliefs are sincere and of a religious nature,’ which a court must accept as 
true, and the ‘legal conclusion that . . . [plaintiffs’] religious exercise is substantially burdened,’ an inquiry 
the court must undertake”) (citation omitted); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 701 n.6 (1986) (“[F]or the 
adjudication of a [Free Exercise] constitutional claim, the Constitution, rather than an individual’s 
religion, must supply the frame of reference.”). 
52 Michael C. Dorf, The Troublingly Widening Gyre of Complicity Claims, VERDICT (Nov. 1, 2017), 
https://verdict.justia.com/2017/11/01/troublingly-widening-gyre-complicity-claims. An objective 
conception of complicity also animates the First Amendment Scholars’ amicus brief in Fulton v. 
Philadelphia, when they suggest that it is “outlandish” for Catholic Social Services to worry that 
Philadelphia would be compelling it to speak and act according to Philadelphia’s beliefs were it to abide 
by Philadelphia’s non-discrimination law. See Brief of First Amendment Scholars As Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents at 26, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, No. 19–123 (Aug. 20, 2020). 
53 See generally Amy J. Sepinwall, Faultless Guilt: Toward a Relationship-Based Account of 
Criminal Liability, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 521 (2017) (describing the conventional conception of 
complicity and tracing its origins). 
54 It was on just this basis that most lower courts denied that the contraceptive mandate made 
employers complicit in their employees’ contraceptive use. See, e.g., Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 
865 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (“[A]n employer, by virtue of paying . . . for an employee’s 
health care, does not become a party to the employee’s health care decisions.”). Cf. Autocam Corp. v. 
Sebelius, NO. 1:12–CV–1096, 2012 WL 6845677, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 24, 2012) (“The mandate 
does not compel the [owners] as individuals to do anything. They do not have to use or buy contraceptives 
for themselves or anyone else.”). 
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is not tantamount to participating in a marriage: If it were, there would be a 
lot of polygamous bakers in the world.”55  
There is nothing inherently problematic about an objective conception 
of complicity. Indeed, that conception should govern when the state, or even 
the moral community, is judging an individual’s guilt. Life would be 
oppressive if we could be judged complicit for even the most tenuous 
connections to others’ wrongs.56 The problem here is that the objective 
conception makes no sense when applied to conscience-based complicity 
claims, for these are fundamentally about an individual judging her own 
guilt. It is no answer to say to the conscientious objector to a military draft, 
“well, the state does not believe war is morally wrong,” or “don’t worry 
about your conscience; you will just be cleaning the guns/cooking the meals, 
etc.” A person cannot replace her own sense of right and wrong—or her own 
sense of when she is sufficiently close to a wrong to be implicated in it—
with someone else’s. If it were reasonable to demand that she did, the state 
would never offer conscientious exemptions. Why, then, does the state do so? 
The answer, as I argue at greater length elsewhere, is that the state has 
an obligation to protect individuals from the experience of acting against 
conscience.57 Acting against conscience can be deeply painful; more than 
that, it can be deeply violative of one’s integrity or self-conception.58 Being 
compelled by law to do something one believes is wrong can also disable 
one from actively condemning the wrong when others commit it; that is, it 
can undermine one’s standing and authority to oppose the wrong, which is a 
loss to the moral community as a whole.59  
Since, in offering conscience-based exemptions from laws or policies, 
we aim to respond to how the conscientious objector would feel were they 
required to participate in another’s (putative) wrong, we cannot proceed 
objectively. It makes no sense for us to substitute our sense of right and 
wrong for theirs; nor does it make sense to super-impose our sense of the 
kind or degree of connection necessary to “in fact” make one complicit.60 
 
55 John Corvino,“Bake Me a Cake”: Three Paths for Balancing Liberty and Equality, WHAT’S 
WRONG? (Oct. 15, 2015), https://whatswrongcvsp.com/2015/10/15/guest-post-from-john-corvino-bake-
me-a-cake-three-paths-for-balancing-liberty-and-equality/. 
56 Compare Herlinde Pauer-Studer, Complicity and Conditions of Agency, 35 J. APPLIED PHIL. 643, 
643–44 (2018) (illustrating the tension in defining a more expansive understanding of complicity that 
goes beyond intentionality and causality, but indicating that complicity should still require the agent to 
be involved in the organization in question) with Christopher Kutz, Causeless Complicity, 1 CRIM. L. & 
PHIL. 289, 294–95 (2007) (arguing that the requirement that one make a causal difference is merely the 
paradigmatic, but not the only, case of blameworthy complicity). 
57 See generally Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for 
Religious Exemptions in Hobby Lobby’s Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897 (2015) [hereinafter 
Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity]. 
58 Id. at 1957.  
59 Nicolas Cornell & Amy Sepinwall, Complicity and Hypocrisy, 19 POL., PHIL. & ECON. 154, 166 (2020). 
60 I argue elsewhere that complicity claims involve three dimensions: moral and relational (the two 
factors I identify in the text) as well as factual. See generally Sepinwall, supra note 57 (utilizing these 
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Instead, we have to allow that others may think some conduct wrongful even 
if we see it as innocent; and they may think their contribution to wrongful 
conduct morally implicating even if we might see that contribution as trivial 
or tenuous enough to make no moral difference at all.  
Once we recognize that conscience-based claims are necessarily 
subjective, we can see the flaw in the claim that, say, a cake baker’s 
contribution to a same-sex marriage is too tenuous to make the baker 
complicit in the marriage or that the owner of the Red Hen should not have 
viewed herself as implicated in the President’s immigration policies simply 
by virtue of having fed his then-press secretary a meal. It does not matter 
that we would not assign responsibility to the baker or the Red Hen owner 
for serving the customers they did. What matters is that each of them takes 
themselves to be implicated. And if we are to have a legal regime that at 
least sometimes yields to an individual’s conscience, then we will need to 
take seriously individuals’ concerns about complicity even if they do not 
track the state’s (or the moral community’s) conception of right and wrong 
or the state’s conception of what makes for a complicit connection. 
With that said, to take a complicity claim seriously is not yet to conclude 
that it should ground an exemption. Other considerations are relevant too, 
including the costs to third parties of granting the exemption. But one 
consideration that should not be relevant is the one on which proponents of 
Equal Access rely—namely, that commerce is inherently amoral. 
B. The Market as a Morality-Free Zone 
The idea that the market insulates its participants from moral concerns 
has figured prominently in the culture wars.61 For example, one 
commissioner adjudicating the civil rights complaint against the baker in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop suggested that the baker could “believe ‘what he 
wants to believe,’ but cannot act on his religious beliefs if he ‘decides to do 
business in the state.’”62 And in Hobby Lobby, the Court contended with the 
claim that for-profit corporations had no conscience rights “because the 
purpose of such corporations is simply to make money.”63 That claim 
appeared in the remarks of some commentators, lower court judges rejecting 
other contraceptive mandate challenges, and Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting 
 
three dimensions to assess the Hobby Lobby decision). While I maintain that respecting conscience 
requires that we defer to the objector’s assessment of whether the conduct she opposes is morally wrong 
and whether the contribution she challenges relates her to that wrong in a way that would make her 
complicit, I deny that we must defer to her assessment of the facts.  
61 See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Speech or Conduct? The Free Speech Claims of Wedding 
Vendors, 65 EMORY L.J. 241, 244 (2015) (“[T]he business context essentially neutralizes any potential 
message of endorsement.”); supra notes 20 and 45 and accompanying text. 
62 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729 (2018) (quoting the 
hearing transcript). 
63 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2770 (2014) (footnote omitted). The 
Court’s opinion refutes this claim by rehearsing the various conscientious initiatives businesses 
undertake, oftentimes at a financial cost. Id. at 2771 n.24. 
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opinion in Hobby Lobby.64 All subscribe to the thought—typically the 
calling-card of efficiency theorists65—that businesses have one and only one 
purpose: to maximize profits.66 This Section responds to this amoral, 
avaricious picture of the marketplace, arguing that it provides cover and 
 
64 E.g., Brief of Constitutional Accountability Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of the 
Government at 25, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354); Brief of 
Amicus Curiae Jewish Social Policy Action Network in Support of the Government at 8–9, 14, Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354); Brief of Brennan Center for Justice 
at N.Y.U. School of Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Government at 2, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 
2751 (2014) (No. 13-354); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. 
Servs., No. 13–1144, 2013 WL 1277419, at 4 (3d Cir. Feb. 8, 2013) (Garth, J., concurring) (noting that 
the mission of Conestoga, “like that of any other for-profit, secular business, is to make money in the 
commercial sphere”) (citation omitted); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2796–97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
65 As Milton Friedman, the Chicago economist famously wrote, “there is one and only one social 
responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase profits. . . .” 
MILTON FRIEDMAN WITH ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (2002). This view has 
been championed by many a law and economics scholar, to the point where Henry Hansmann and Reinier 
Kraakman could triumphantly declare that “[t]here is no longer any serious competitor to the view that 
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.” Henry Hansmann & 
Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001). For an overview 
of the scholarly ascendancy of Friedman’s position, see Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: 
The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 39 (2004). 
While Friedman himself allowed that the law would and should constrain businesses, such that they 
“engage[] in open and free competition without deception or fraud,” 
Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-
doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html, some of his acolytes go even further than him, 
arguing that managers might evade regulatory laws if doing so would enhance profits. See, e.g., Frank 
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 
1168 n.36 (1982) (“Managers have no general obligation to avoid violating regulatory laws, when 
violations are profitable to the firm . . . . We put to one side laws concerning violence or other acts thought 
to be malum in se.” (citations omitted)). For a trenchant critique of this position, see Robert W. 
Gordon, The Return of the Lawyer-Statesman?, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1746–50 (2017).  
66 See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501, 1547 (2012) 
(arguing that “[w]ithin for-profit businesses, even though moral convictions might come into play, the 
profit motive (in some cases, an obligation to maximize shareholder wealth) must drive 
decisionmaking”); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 
724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (“We do not see how a for-profit artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing 
only in contemplation of law . . . that was created to make money could exercise . . . an inherently ‘human’ 
right.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 857 (7th Cir. 
2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (“So far as it appears, the mission of Grote Industries, like that of any other 
for-profit, secular business, is to make money in the commercial sphere.”); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 
2796–97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[R]eligious organizations exist to serve a community of believers. 
For-profit corporations do not fit that bill. . . . [F]or- profit corporations are different from religious non-
profits in that they use labor to make a profit, rather than to perpetuate [the] religious value[s] [shared by 
a community of believers].”) (alternation in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
For an excellent analysis demonstrating that, in Hobby Lobby, the Justices’ ideological positions shift, 
with the progressive dissenters championing a capitalist vision of the market as amoral, see Nomi Maya 
Stolzenberg, It’s About Money: The Fundamental Contradiction of Hobby Lobby, 88 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 727, 748 (2015). 
 
16 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1 
legitimation for unappealing business behavior and that it is at any rate 
unnecessary to the end of securing equal consumer access. 
1. The Amoral Marketplace Versus Business-with-Conscience 
In many ways, the law marks out the marketplace as amoral. For 
example, the Supreme Court has erected a distinction between expressive 
and commercial enterprises, according to which profit-making cancels out 
important First Amendment freedoms.67 In a similar vein, theorists have 
contended that once one seeks a profit, one must “invariably” operate as a 
public accommodation, open to all.68 The Court’s treatment of commercial 
speech, which typically receives less protection than political speech or art, 
also reflects a general suspicion about the capacity of the market to offer 
anything of non-instrumental value.69 In short, in much law and scholarship,  
the privilege of hanging out a shingle rightly comes at the cost of suspending 
one’s conscience.70 Moreover, the shingle in question need not be that of a 
business run for profit. It can include—as the anti-discrimination law 
 
67 E.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Cf. id. at 636 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Once [an association chooses to] enter[] the 
marketplace of commerce in any substantial degree it loses the complete control over its membership 
that it would otherwise enjoy if it confined its affairs to the marketplace of ideas.”). See also Lupu & 
Tuttle, supra note 39, at 285–86 (“Put more generally, a proposition crucial to religious liberty is that 
religions, to maintain their integrity, must and do discriminate. . . . Commercial entities do not enjoy the 
same protected interest in associational freedom . . .”). For a critique of the commercial/expressive divide, 
see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law, 
66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1230 (2014). 
68 See, e.g., Sepper, supra note 39, at 646 (“[P]rofit motive invariably identifies a place as a public 
accommodation.”). 
69 For a long time, commercial speech was taken to be outside the First Amendment altogether. 
While commercial speech is often crass, self-serving, and obfuscating, it nonetheless can serve valuable 
social ends, as the Court eventually recognized. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) 
(protecting advertisement informing women about health centers willing to provide abortions). In an 
early case extending First Amendment protection to commercial speech, the Court noted that “[t]he 
relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in the 
marketplace of ideas.” Id. at 826. See also Seana Shiffrin, Compelled Association, Morality, and Market 
Dynamics, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317, 322 (2007) (recognizing the value in having “those who farm 
organically for moral and political reasons” convey that information so that similarly minded buyers can 
distinguish organic and conventional products). 
70 See, e.g., supra note 6. This view figured prominently in the amicus briefs of those supporting 
the gay couple’s right to a wedding cake in Masterpiece Cakeshop. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Public 
Accommodation Law Scholars in Support of Respondents at 7, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. 
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, No. 16-111 (Oct. 30, 2017) (“The common law history supports a right of 
equal access to businesses serving the public…. A business that met this definition could not exclude any 
member of the public without good cause.”); Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Respondents, 138 S. Ct. 1719, No. 16-1111 (Oct. 30, 2017) (“business owners who offer 
their goods and services to the public cannot claim constitutional sanctuary from public accommodations 
laws”). It can also be found in the amicus briefs of those opposing Catholic Social Services’ bid for an 
exemption in Fulton. See, e.g., Brief of First Amendment Scholars in Support of Respondents at 17, 
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, No. 19–123 (Aug. 20, 2020) (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 
261 (1982), for the proposition that “[w]hen followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity 
as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are 
not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.”). 
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challenged in Fulton v. Philadelphia does—any entity open to the public,71 
under an understanding of the “marketplace” that covers retail businesses 
and public service agencies alike.72 
It is undoubtedly true that public accommodations laws prohibiting 
discrimination have worthy aims. To rehearse them briefly here, these laws 
prevent the material harms that exclusion would inflict—for example, the 
expense of time and money to locate a willing purveyor, or worse still the 
complete denial of certain goods and services. They also protect individuals 
from the dignitary harm of being turned away,73 and they express the state’s 
commitment to equality.74 Equal Access has additional benefits for all—for 
example, it “secure[s] the state against domestic strife and unrest, [and] 
preserve[s] the public safety, health, and general welfare.”75 Finally, some 
states and commentators adduce a democracy-reinforcing rationale for 
public accommodations laws,76 since citizens who find that they have been 
recruited into a society that does not offer them fair terms of cooperation 
might well disengage,77 or even turn to antisocial means of attaining the 
goods that the existing distribution has unfairly denied them.78  
Notice, however, that the reasons for public accommodations laws lose 
none of their force if we abandon the vision of the market as morally 
neutered. We need not rule out the possibility, let alone the legitimacy, of 
conscientious commitments on the part of business owners in order to ensure 
the full operation of public accommodations laws. To see this, consider first 
that many of the moral commitments market players seek to enact are 
compatible with, and sometimes even supportive of, the egalitarian and 
dignitary goals of public accommodations laws. When a store owner hangs 
a rainbow sign in her window, or declines to sell anything but fair-trade 
goods, or offers to pay well above minimum wage for what would typically 
be a minimum-wage position, cutting into her own profit margins as a result, 
 
71 See PHILA. CODE § 9-1102(w) (2020) (public accommodations include “services . . . extended, 
offered, . . .  or otherwise made available to the public” as well as “all . . . services provided by . . . the 
City, its departments, boards and commissions.”); id. § 9-1106 (prohibition on discrimination).  
72 See Brief for City Respondents at 6, Fulton, No. 19–123. 
73 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (“[T]he 
fundamental object of [the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] was to 
vindicate ‘the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public 
establishments.’”) (quoting Senate Committee Report). 
74 Sepper, supra note 39, at 664 n.162; Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious 
Accommodations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 627–28 (2015). 
75 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.01 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Second Reg. Sess. Of the 26th Leg.). 
See Sepper, supra note 39, at 664 n.162 (2016) (collecting other statutes with similar language). 
76 See Sepper, supra note 39, at 664 (collecting other statutes with similar language). 
77 Cf. Iris Marion Young, Political Responsibility and Structural Injustice, in LINDLEY LECTURE 
SERIES 1–3 (2003), https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/cas_sites/sociology/pdf/Political 
Responsibility.pdf.  
78 See, e.g., DANIEL HART & JAMES YOUNISS, RENEWING DEMOCRACY IN YOUNG AMERICA 44 
(2018) (mentioning French riots against lack of educational opportunity). 
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she is enacting commitments to social justice and equality at least consonant 
with those underpinning public accommodations laws.  
Second, a morally neutered conception of the market is pernicious in its 
own right, and we should pause to consider why. That conception invites 
moral complacency, if not worse.79 It presupposes an atomism that both 
licenses self-interest and also overlooks much moralized market activity.80  
Take, for example, Ann Verrill, a Portland, Maine, restaurateur who, in the 
aftermath of the Orlando nightclub killings, posted a message on Facebook 
stating that individuals who owned assault rifles of the kind used in the 
massacre were not welcome at her restaurant.81 Of course, she might by law 
have had to serve them anyway, but she needn’t have made them feel 
welcome.82 Or again, consider that the clothing company Patagonia imposes 
an “Earth tax” on itself, donating a portion of its revenues in the form of 
grants for environmental activism because, “[a]s a company that uses 
resources and produces waste, [they] recognise [their] impact on the 
environment and feel a responsibility to give back.”83 In January 2020, 
British Airways voluntarily cancelled all of its direct flights to and from 
mainland China to prevent international transmission of the coronavirus. 
The cancellations presumably came at a significant cost to the airline,84 but, 
as it explained, the “‘safety of our customers and crew is always our 
 
79 Cf. Shiffrin, supra note 69, at 325 (“I’m not sure it is wise or desirable to adopt a theory that if 
publicly known, accepted, and implemented would not only treat market actors as amoral, but would 
encourage market actors—whether producers, advertisers, or consumers—to adopt this as a self-
conception (that is, to think of themselves as amoral, apolitical agents.)”). 
80 On atomism in the market, see Orts & Sepinwall, supra note 42, at 648–49. For examples of 
conscientious market activity, see infra text accompanying notes 81–86; Giuseppe Danese, Woke Capital 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). See generally Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. 
Skover, Pissing in the Snow: A Cultural Approach to the First Amendment, 45 STAN. L. REV. 783, 806 
(1993) (reviewing JAMES B. TWITCHELL, CARNIVAL CULTURE: THE TRASHING OF TASTE IN AMERICA 
(1992)) (recounting how the profit motive has eviscerated the discourse that the First Amendment was 
designed to protect, replacing it with “mass media” in the most literal sense of that term). There may 
be much truth in a critique like Collins and Skover’s, but it is also bleakly cynical, and so perhaps 
overly apologetic. 
81 Seelye, supra note 9.  
82 Would Verrill have been permitted to convey her outrage in ways that caused patrons to leave, 
thereby achieving the result of excluding them? For an exploration of the limits of hostile speech within 
a commercial establishment, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 
UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1824 (1992). 
83 Growing the Grassroots, PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia.com/au/pages/environmental-
grants (last visited Aug. 8, 2020). Merck Pharmaceuticals famously produces and gives away at no cost 
a drug whose sole purpose is to cure river blindness in a population that has no ability to pay for the drug 
itself. See Merck Offers Free Distribution of New River Blindness Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 1987), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/22/world/merck-offers-free-distribution-of-new-river-blindness-
drug.html; Over 30 Years: The Mectizan Donation Program, MERCK (Dec. 1, 2019), http://www.merck
.com/about/featured-stories/mectizan.html (describing Merck’s program through to the present day). 
84 Cf. Sylvan Lane, Stocks Slide After U.S. Airlines Cancel Service to China Over Coronavirus, 
THE HILL (Jan. 31, 2020, 11:46 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/480886-stocks-slide-after-us-
airlines-cancel-service-to-china-over-coronavirus. 
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priority.’”85 These practices suggest that a good number of businesses do not 
think of themselves as working in an amoral sphere; instead, they 
authentically subscribe to an ethic of “doing well and doing good.”86 
Moreover, there may be instrumental reasons to promote a vision of 
business as morally inflected, rather than morally neutered. We can conceive 
of businesses as rapacious and amoral, and public accommodations laws as 
a necessary corrective. On that conception, businesses may well live down 
to our expectations.87 Or we can conceive of businesses as sensitive and 
oftentimes responsive to moral considerations, driven to forego maximal 
profit or even sometimes to incur losses for the sake of some moral objective. 
On the latter view, public accommodations laws could then be seen as a 
backstop for the business bad apples; better still, they might be seen as 
continuous with the ethos that underpins the good business itself.88 
Call the model of business advanced here “business-with-conscience.” 
While that model acknowledges and celebrates morally responsive business 
practices, it is not meant to sound market triumphalism. Business-with-
conscience, at least as it is currently instantiated, will hardly cure capitalist 
markets of their unfair distributive consequences,89 the pressures they 
impose to produce too much, too cheaply, wreaking too much harm on the 
 
85 Rosie Perper, British Airways Cancels All Flights to Mainland China as Wuhan Coronavirus 
Spreads, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 29, 2020, 2:43 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/british-airways-
cancels-all-flights-to-china-wuhan-coronavirus-2020-1. 
86 E.g., Jeff Swartz, Doing Well and Doing Good: The Business Community and National Service, 
BROOKINGS (Sept. 1, 2002), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/doing-well-and-doing-good-the-
business-community-and-national-service/ (describing Timberland’s efforts to promote volunteer work 
and public service). Cf. Sabine Tsuruda, Volunteer Work, Inclusivity, and Social Equality, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LABOUR LAW 306, 311–12 (Hugh Collins, Gillian Lester & Virginia 
Mantouvalou eds., 2018) (rejecting the idea that civic and humanitarian aims can be the province only of 
volunteer work, rather than paid employment) (footnotes and internal quotations omitted).  
87 Cf. Robin West, The Zealous Advocacy of Justice in a Less Than Ideal Legal World, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 973, 974 (1999) (“[J]ustice is not going to be the miraculous product of a system in which none of 
the actors are required to pursue it.”). 
88 There is some thought that businesses are of necessity maximally profit-driven, not only because 
their survival requires as much, see Baker, supra note 41, at 985, but also as a matter of fiduciary 
obligation to their shareholders. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various 
Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 
STETSON L. REV. 23, 23 (1991) (stating that corporations and their directors “owe fiduciary duties to 
shareholders and to shareholders alone”). But the view that managers must run the firm exclusively, or 
even primarily, in the interests of shareholders is contestable. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-
Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2002) (challenging arguments 
in favor of shareholder primacy that are “as a positive matter, inaccurate, incorrect, and unpersuasive to 
the careful and neutral observer”). Moreover, even if true, the assumption that shareholders themselves 
care only about profits reproduces the same presumptions about amorality that the conception of morally-
inflected business practices advanced here aims to displace. 
89 See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1 (Arthur Goldhammer 
trans., 2014) (“When the rate of return on capital exceeds the rate of growth of output and income. . . 
capitalism automatically generates arbitrary and unsustainable inequalities that radically undermine the 
meritocratic values on which democratic societies are based.”). 
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environment,90 or most of the other ills for which they are rightly criticized.91 
Still, there is no point in denying that businesses can and sometimes do good. 
The morally neutered view of the market that exemption opponents advance 
is not necessarily accurate, certainly not unavoidable, and perhaps not even 
helpful to the progressive egalitarian agenda.92 
With that said, one might concede that it is all to the good if a business 
adheres to higher moral standards than the law requires—for example, by 
holding itself to greener practices than current environmental regulations 
mandate. But the cases where store owners want to discriminate for 
conscience-based reasons involve deviating downward from what the law 
(and arguably political morality) requires by refusing equal treatment for the 
sake of the owners’ personal commitments. Is it nothing but rhetorical 
sleight of hand to trumpet these store owners as paragons of moral conscience?  
2. Common Carriers and Discrimination 
One way to motivate the thought that no form of discrimination can 
count as conscientious emerges from Joseph Singer’s path-breaking work 
recovering and reconceptualizing public accommodations law. Singer offers 
a fascinating discussion of the historic origins of this body of law, pitting a 
“monopoly” explanation against a “holding-out” explanation.93 The 
former—now ascendant—holds that common carriers were bound to serve 
all-comers only because they enjoyed a monopoly; as such, no such duty 
need accrue to businesses operating in a market where there are 
competitors.94 The latter explanation—now forgotten, Singer writes—
grounds universal access in a moral duty: one who “put[s] out [a] sign” or 
holds himself out to the public as a business open for customers is bound to 
accept everyone; to do otherwise would be to succumb to “prejudices [] 
 
90 See, e.g., Frederick Engels, The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man, 
MARXISTS (May–June 1876), https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1876/part-played-labour/ 
(“What cared the Spanish planters in Cuba, who burned down forests on the slopes of the mountains and 
obtained from the ashes sufficient fertilizer for one generation of very highly profitable coffee trees – 
what cared they that the heavy tropical rainfall afterwards washed away the unprotected upper stratum 
of the soil, leaving behind only bare rock!”).  
91 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 
(2012) (highlighting various examples of societal harm arising through commodification). 
92 A related point has been raised in defense of Catholic Social Services’ conscience claims in 
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. For example, James Campbell argues that Philadelphia is disserving needy 
children “by eliminating agencies that operate consistently with traditional Catholic (and similar 
religious) beliefs about marriage, thereby reducing foster-care resources in the midst of an existing 
shortage.” James Campbell, Symposium: Philadelphia’s Exclusion of Faith-Based Foster Agency 
Departs from History and Undermines Interests of Children, SCOTUSBLOG, (Oct. 29, 2020, 11:16 AM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/10/symposium-philadelphias-exclusion-of-faith-based-foster-
agency-departs-from-history-and-undermines-interests-of-children/.  
93 Singer, No Right, supra note 6, at 1401–08. 
94 Singer, Sodom, supra note 39, at 938–39. 
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unworthy of our better manhood.”95 Singer explains further that the 
monopoly rationale has a dubious origin, propelled as it was by Lochnerian 
economic liberty and Jim Crow racism. And it is morally dubious to boot 
because it locates the wrong of discrimination in the inconvenience it 
imposes rather than the dignitary harm of being treated as if one is a member 
of a lower caste.96 
In place of the libertarian picture, under which businesses have 
unfettered rights to refuse service in a competitive marketplace,97 Singer 
urges a return to the holding-out picture. In this picture, store owners cannot, 
for any reason, refuse anyone willing to accept the commercial offer the 
store extends. This picture ensures not only that members of protected 
classes will be guaranteed service but so too anyone with the means and 
willingness to pay for the store’s goods and services.98 But notice the 
implication of this absolutist view: Singer’s picture would require a reception 
hall owner to rent her space to the NAACP and KKK alike. By contrast, the 
owner could decline the KKK rental but not the NAACP on the model of 
business-with-conscience. Why might one then prefer Singer’s picture?  
Singer offers an argument rooted in pre-legal moral commitments. He 
writes, “civil rights laws do not limit property rights. They define what 
property rights can exist in a free and democratic society. They establish the 
structural baseline, the infrastructure of a society that is committed to granting 
equal protection of the laws.”99 The holding-out picture would then make civil 
rights laws conceptually and normatively prior to property rights, whereas the 
business-with-conscience model is compatible with viewing state public 
accommodations laws as super-imposed upon existing property entitlements.  
There is undoubtedly something appealing in Singer’s genealogy: it 
allows us to say to the person who insists that anti-discrimination laws 
violate her property rights that her property rights never included the right 
to discriminate in the first instance. But that rhetorical advantage has to be 
 
95 Singer, No Right, supra note 6, at 1410. The holding-out notion is not completely absent from 
recent doctrine. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) (“Most important, 
the shopping center by choice of its owner is not limited to the personal use of appellants. It is instead a 
business establishment that is open to the public to come and go as they please.”). 
96 Singer, Sodom, supra note 39, at 938 (“The idea that one can ‘just go elsewhere’ misses the point 
entirely. The question is not whether one can find a store willing to let you in and treat you with dignity. 
The question is whether one has a right to enter stores without worrying about such things.”). See also 
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 292 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“Discrimination 
is not simply dollars and cents, hamburgers and movies; it is the humiliation, frustration, and 
embarrassment that a person must surely feel when he is told that he is unacceptable as a member of the 
public . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
97 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Public Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Why 
Freedom of Association Counts as a Human Right, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1290 (2014) (arguing that 
business owners should be permitted to discriminate so long as would-be customers can be served elsewhere). 
98 Some states take this absolutist stance when it comes to housing too, forbidding refusals on 
conscience-based grounds to anyone. See, e.g., Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm’n, 874 P.2d 
274, 279–80 (Alaska 1994) (holding that the Free Exercise clause does not permit landlord to refuse to 
rent to unmarried couples in violation of antidiscrimination statute).  
99 Singer, Sodom, supra note 39, at 947–48 (footnote omitted). 
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balanced against the practical upshot of conceiving of business property as 
a belated development, beholden to Singer’s structural baseline. And the 
most egalitarian understanding of that baseline would prohibit every refusal 
of service.  
I think this goes too far. Compelled universal access recruits store 
owners into supporting projects they—oftentimes rightly—have reason to 
oppose (such as the legally authorized but morally troubling marriages of 
underage girls).100 And it deprives individuals of meaningful work lives. 
Work can already be alienating, in any number of ways, even if one is 
self-employed. Even the most enriching of jobs can come with its fair share 
of grunt work and tedium. Business realities might compel the person who 
owns her own store or restaurant to put up with conduct that she would not 
otherwise tolerate (e.g., from berating customers, leering suppliers, 
hot-tempered talent in the kitchen, and so on). Why shouldn’t she want to 
deny her blood, sweat, and tears to individuals or endeavors she has reason 
to oppose? To be sure, many individuals lack the kind of workplace 
autonomy that would allow them to choose their clientele. This is surely a 
problem in its own right.101 But for those who do enjoy such autonomy, it 
seems desirable to allow them to exercise it. 
In Part III, I advance a new understanding of public accommodations 
laws that would allow businesses to refuse service to people who seek a 
store’s wares for projects promoting hate, even if those projects are 
connected to the putative customer’s protected characteristics (e.g., a 
member of the Christian KKK church wants to rent a reception hall for his 
church’s banquet). But first we must see why the Equal Access policy, like 
Singer’s holding-out account, sweeps too broadly and, worse still, fails to 
offer robust protection to the very minorities it is designed to serve.  
II. THE UNEQUAL ASPECTS OF EQUAL ACCESS 
Equal Access holds that a public accommodation may not provide a 
good or service to one person that it would deny to another. That principle 
received explicit endorsement in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission.102 And indeed 
the role it played there belies the widely accepted view that Masterpiece was 
 
100 See infra notes 153 and 183–86 and accompanying text. 
101 See, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, Private Government, in LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND PRIVATE 
GOVERNMENT 94, 95–96 (2015) (describing how the modern workplace functions like a dictatorship). 
102 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). See supra note 21 (citing the opinions of Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, and 
Ginsburg, each of whom adhered to a version of this principle). 
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a non-decision103—narrow and sui generis, or even a “punt.”104 To be sure, 
the Court did not rule on the central question in the case—namely, whether 
a vendor may refuse, on free exercise or free speech grounds, to provide a 
custom-made product, especially one that has words or artistry. Instead, the 
Court found that the Colorado proceedings were infected by prejudice and 
so vacated the decisions below.105 But in finding that Colorado had acted 
with “hostility to religion,”106 the Court relied heavily on Equal Access.107 
So too has virtually every other court in justifying the requirement that a 
place of public accommodation offer members of a protected class the very 
same products or services that it offers to others.108 And yet, as this Part 
argues, Equal Access is bound to lead us astray. 
What then explains its grip? Equal Access would be a passable rule of 
thumb if one wanted to identify, say, the distinctive wrong of the lunch 
counter owner who refused to serve Black people in the Jim Crow South. 
The lunch counter has a set menu; in offering the menu items to white people 
but not Black people, the owner impermissibly discriminated on the basis of 
a protected characteristic. So, contrary to Equal Access, the owner denied 
one party the qualitatively same good it could readily have had available and 
willingly provided to another. Even there, however, one might want 
something that more richly conceptualized the nature of the exclusion—
capturing the fact that the basis of the exclusion was an immutable, 
ascriptive characteristic; or, better still, one might point to the way in which 
the exclusion reinforced the subordination of an already oppressed group.109 
After all, refusing to serve all Black people has a unique significance and 
 
103 See, e.g., Christine Emba, The Supreme Court Wasn’t Ready to Decide on the Wedding Cake. 
Neither Are We., WASH. POST (June 5, 2018, 7:34 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-
supreme-court-wasnt-ready-to-decide-on-the-wedding-cake-neither-are-we/2018/06/05/55c890f8-
6905-11e8-bea7-c8eb28bc52b1_story.html?utm_term=.0bc495192b55 (calling the decision “half-
baked”).  
104 Mark Joseph Stern, Gay Americans Have Little to Fear from the Supreme Court’s Compromise 
in Masterpiece Cakeshop, SLATE (June 4, 2018, 11:54 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2018/06/the-supreme-courts-decision-in-masterpiece-cakeshop-is-a-kennedy-compromise.html.  
105 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1732. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 1727. 
108 For example, in Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), the New Mexico 
Supreme Court illustrated the principle enshrined in its Human Rights Act (NMHRA) as follows: “If a 
restaurant offers a full menu to male customers, it may not refuse to serve entrees to women, even if it 
will serve them appetizers. The NMHRA does not permit businesses to offer a ‘limited menu’ of goods 
or services to customers on the basis of a status that fits within one of the protected categories.” Willock, 
309 P.3d at 62. See also Gifford v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422, 428–29 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (quoting 
the Elane language just cited as support); Klein v. Or. Bureau of Lab. & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051, 1061 
(Or. Ct. App. 2017) (describing the nature of the discrimination in this way: “Sweetcakes provides a 
service—making wedding cakes—to heterosexual couples who intend to wed, but it denies the service 
to same-sex couples who likewise intend to wed.”). But see Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 
448 P.3d 890, 926 (Ariz. 2019) (holding that custom invitations were pure speech and public 
accommodations ordinance requiring service would then constitute compelled speech in violation of the 
First Amendment). 
109  See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 107, 123–
24 (1976). 
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sting—different, for example, from a refusal to serve, say, the father of the 
bully who had recently bested the lunch counter owner’s son in an 
unsportsmanlike contest. But still, as a first cut, Equal Access tracks at least 
a part of the wrong of anti-Black policies. It captures the intuitive idea that 
we ought to treat likes alike.110 
Where Equal Access works, it works because the would-be customers 
will make the same use of the products or services on offer. The two 
individuals who seek to be served at the lunch counter typically want the 
same experience or endpoint—the consumption of a meal. There is no 
difference in their purpose, and, as I have argued, a difference in purpose in 
fact grounds an important distinction in what a putative customer asks of a 
vendor. Think again of renting one’s hall for a KKK rally relative to an 
NAACP event.  
Further, it is not just that Equal Access is over-inclusive, forbidding 
refusals of service that the law ought to allow; it is also under-inclusive, 
permitting discrimination against some individuals who should be protected. 
Moreover, in other cases still, the principle fails to yield determinate results, 
since the question of whether two objects are the “same” is one the principle 
does not illuminate. Finally, the principle rests on a logical fallacy. I elaborate 
on each of these in turn, beginning with the principle’s logical flaws.  
A. Equal Access Rests on a Logical Fallacy 
The Equal Access principle is meant to distinguish between permissible 
and impermissible refusals of service, especially when it comes to the 
vendor’s inventory or repertoire. A vendor offends against no one, the 
thought goes, if he refuses to provide a good or service that he does not take 
to be a part of what he is in the market to sell. So, a cake baker who refuses 
a customer’s order for brisket, or a massage therapist who refuses a patron’s 
request for a haircut, does not impermissibly discriminate, even if the person 
making the request is a member of a protected class. Neither the baker nor 
the massage therapist has held themselves out as purveyors of the requested 
 
110 Cf. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
19 (1959) (“A principled decision . . . is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, 
reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved.”). Of 
course, Weschler had an overly rigid conception of “generality,” which abstracted from considerations 
that in fact relevantly distinguished the cases he critiqued, as Louis Pollak convincingly showed. Louis 
H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 32–34 (1959). The critique of the neutral principle doctrine offered here is a specific version of 
Pollak’s larger complaint—principled decisions should be attuned to the particulars, especially 
particulars having to do with race or other dynamics sustaining inequality. 
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good or service. As it is often put, the vendor in question “would not sell the 
requested [product or service] to anyone.”111 
That principle proved decisive in distinguishing between the Colorado 
cake baker in Masterpiece who, for religious reasons, refused to provide a 
cake for a same-sex wedding, and a second Colorado cake baker who, for 
secular moral reasons, refused to provide a cake with religious anti-gay 
messages. The second case was brought by William Jack, a fundamentalist 
Christian, who requested two cakes from Azucar bakery—one with an image 
of an X-ed out gay couple and the other with a biblical verse decrying 
homosexuality.112 When the owner of Azucar, Marjorie Silva, refused to 
provide either cake, Jack filed a complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission. Applying its Equal Access principle, the Commission held that 
Azucar did not violate Colorado’s public accommodations law in refusing 
because Silva would not have supplied anti-gay cakes to anyone; her refusal 
was predicated on the nature of the cake that was sought, not the identity of 
the customer seeking it.113  In this way, Silva was like the baker who refuses 
to provide a Jewish customer with a brisket—not because that baker does 
not serve Jews but because that baker does not serve briskets. Justice Kagan 
affirmed the distinction between Phillips and Jack on the ground that “[a] 
vendor can choose the products he sells but not the customers he serves.”114 
While that principle seems compelling on its face, it actually turns on a 
logical fallacy, which we can see if we break it down: 
Principle 1: If a vendor, V, does not sell briskets to anyone, 
then V does not offend against a particular customer C when 
V refuses to sell a brisket to C.  
Principle 2: If V does sell briskets to some customers then 
he offends against C when V refuses to sell a brisket to C.115 
 
111 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. V. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1733 n.*, 1735 (2018) 
(Kagan, J., concurring). 
112 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae William Jack and the National Center for Law and Policy in 
Support of Petitioners at 5, Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-1111), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/16-111_tsac_william_jack_et_al.pdf. Jack is not the only one aiming to turn 
the tables on bakers who support equal rights for members of the LGBTQ community. In a bid to expose 
hypocrisy, some in the “anti-gay community” are ordering “‘Gay Marriage Is Wrong’ cakes from gay-
friendly bakeries.” Isabelle Chapman, Colorado Bakery Facing Legal Action After Refusing to Make 
Anti-Gay Cake, AOL (Jan. 20, 2015, 1:04 PM), https://www.aol.com/article/2015/01/20/colorado-
bakery-facing-legal-action-after-refusing-to-make-anti/21132364/. 
113 See, e.g., John Corvino, Drawing a Line in the ‘Gay Wedding Cake’ Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/27/opinion/gay-wedding-cake.html (discussing the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s ruling). 
114 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1733 n.* (Kagan, J., concurring). 
115 Formally, Principle 2 is the inverse of Principle 1. But one cannot validly infer the inverse of a 
principle from the original; one can only validly infer the contrapositive. All of this should be familiar 
from LSAT studying (though apparently lost on established jurists). See, e.g., Conditional Reasoning 
and Logical Equivalence, KHAN ACAD., https://www.khanacademy.org/test-prep/lsat/lsat-lessons/logic-
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Principle 2 is effectively a version of Equal Access. The problem is that 
Principle 2 is supposed to derive from Principle 1, when in fact Principle 1 
does not logically compel Principle 2. Compare: if there are no eggs in the 
house, you cannot make a meringue. If there are eggs in the house, then you 
can make a meringue. Or: if the car has no gas, it cannot be driven. If the car 
has gas, it can be driven. Or again: if you do not have a date for the prom, 
you will feel awkward attending. If you have a date for the prom, then you 
will not feel awkward attending. In all of these cases, the first proposition 
has an antecedent that states a necessary condition for the consequent—
meringues require eggs; cars require gas; non-awkward proms (let’s 
imagine) require dates. But necessary conditions are oftentimes not 
sufficient—meringues also require sugar; cars need inflated tires and 
working parts; proms require winning personalities, decent dance skills, and 
smooth repartee if they are not to feel awkward (for some of us anyway). By 
the same token, getting one’s hands on a brisket requires a purveyor of 
briskets. But that is not all: a customer may purchase a brisket from its 
purveyor only if she has the money to pay, she is wearing shoes, she is not 
smoking in the store, etc. The problem, generally stated, is this: in each of 
the foregoing cases, the second principle is the inverse of the first and it is a 
central tenet of propositional logic that you cannot establish the truth of a 
conditional proposition simply by inverting another conditional proposition 
you know to be true. But that is just how courts and commentators proceed 
in deriving Equal Access. Again, they hold that vendors may decline to sell 
someone a good that they would not sell to anyone else; but once a vendor 
does sell that good to someone, he must sell it to everyone else. That 
progression of thought presupposes that the only reason to turn someone 
away is because one does not sell the product they are requesting to anyone. 
But that is not a claim that courts or commentators can presuppose; instead, 
it is precisely the claim that stands in need of argument. Of course, there 
could be compelling reasons not to refuse any customer a good or service 
that is the same as one the seller has sold or would sell to someone else. But 
what then counts as the “same”?  
B. Problems with Treating Two Goods As “Alike” 
Equal Access prohibits denying one customer a good or service that is 
the same as a good or service the vendor offers another customer. Applying 
this principle immediately thrusts one into a tangled web of problems around 
discerning when two products count as the “same.” One can readily see that 
goods or services might come in endless varieties and which of these are 
sufficiently similar to those the vendor holds himself out as providing and 
which are not already raises difficult issues. For example, if a baker offers 
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cakes decorated in all of the shades of the rainbow must he then agree to 
create a rainbow cake? 
But now let us suppose that a customer wants a product that common 
sense tells us is the same product as one the vendor has sold in the past—it 
is identical in appearance and composition to that other product and, were 
the two to have sat on the store’s shelf at the same time, a customer would 
have had no reason to prefer one to the other. There might nonetheless be a 
meaningful difference between them. Consider, for example, two cakes, 
identical in all respects, each bearing the words “Yay, KKK!” Do the two 
satisfy the same-product requirement of Equal Access if the first cake is for 
a celebration of the three Kardashian sisters and the second a celebration of 
the Ku Klux Klan? Here, even though the words are the same, the referent 
of “KKK” is different. Why shouldn’t they count as different such that 
denying the Christian KKK customer his cake does not run afoul of Equal 
Access? Nor could we be assured that two cakes were the same even if they 
were identical in appearance and the intended meaning of whatever words 
they bore was the same too. A baker has reason to care that his 
“Congratulations!” cake will be served at the KKK banquet rather than some 
more benign event. Insofar as Equal Access cannot recognize that sometimes 
the event at which a product will be served (or used) informs the nature of 
the product that it is (i.e., whether it is the same as some identical-looking 
product), Equal Access sweeps too broadly.  
But so too is Equal Access underinclusive, permitting refusals of service 
that it should forbid. For once we allow a vendor unilateral authority to 
control just what products he offers, there is no reason why he might not 
forego product lines precisely in order to discriminate against protected 
individuals. Take, for example, a baker who harbors gay animus and so 
decides that he will not make rainbow cakes for anyone. Equal Access would 
have to countenance the baker’s decision. But that would be to miss the fact 
that there is an expressive slight in denying a gay customer a rainbow cake 
that is absent when the baker denies a rainbow cake for, say, an 
eight-year-old’s birthday party. Put differently, surely the appropriate way 
to judge this baker’s refusal is not to compare what he would or would not 
be willing to serve to other customers; it is just to ask whether he has turned 
someone away on the basis of a protected status.116 
Indeed, Equal Access contains the seeds of its undoing precisely because 
it focuses on treating likes alike. In that way, it builds in a loophole for any 
vendor who can make the case that his wares are customizable—or, more 
compelling still, unique creations. For these vendors, it will never be the case 
that one product is the same as any other. And, since Equal Access requires 
only that the vendor not refuse a product to someone when the vendor has 
 
116 On the relationship between status and conduct, see Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 
661, 696 (2010). 
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offered the same product to others in the past, the vendor who never offers 
the same product twice necessarily never violates Equal Access.  
The point holds as well in that part of the “marketplace” where patrons 
procure public services.117 Take the now-pending case of Fulton v. City of 
Philadelphia, where Catholic Social Services (CSS) is challenging 
Philadelphia’s refusal to have CSS serve as a foster placement agency 
because CSS will not place children with same-sex couples. CSS’s position 
would seem to be a straightforward case of invidious discrimination, but it 
is not one that Equal Access can recognize: Under Equal Access, CSS could 
be found to have discriminated only if it declined to place a child with a 
same-sex couple where it had, or would have, placed a similar child with a 
relevantly similar opposite-sex couple.118 But if a custom-made cake 
qualifies as unique, a fortiori a given child or couple or family or living 
situation is unique too119 (even the happy ones, with no disrespect to 
Tolstoy).120 More generally, given any fact-intensive function or 
personalized service, the details of that function or service will necessarily 
be tailored to the party being served. As such, there will never be a relevant 
precedent with which to compare a challenged refusal of service in order to 
know if the present party has been the target of discrimination.  
Note finally that Equal Access gets the inquiry about what goods a 
vendor must provide backwards. In deciding whether a vendor can supply 
the requested product a patron requests, the vendor does not ask himself, “Is 
the requested product (or service) the same as (or even relevantly similar to) 
products I have provided to others in the past?” Instead, he contemplates the 
meaning for him of the requested product on its own terms. The question is, 
“Can I provide the requested product in good conscience?” If he determines 
that he can, then—but only then—will he conclude that the requested 
product is relevantly similar to others he has offered in the past. In this way, 
sameness or similarity is epiphenomenal. It is the outcome of an inquiry 
about the moral meaning of a good or service, not a consideration that 
informs that outcome. Two goods or services are relevantly similar insofar 
as neither provokes a conscientious objection. But in determining whether a 
 
117 See Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Scholars in Support of Equality in Support of Respondents at 
27, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, No. 19–123 (Aug. 18, 2020) (suggesting that foster agencies operate 
in the “marketplace.”). 
118 See supra note 22. 
119 Thus, a federal district court approvingly quoted foster guidance stating that “‘[a] holistic 
assessment is essential to achieve the intent of each section and make final recommendations regarding 
placement and permanency for children. All families are unique; these questions are not one size fits 
all.’” Blais v. Hunter, No. 2:20-cv-00187-SMJ, 2020 WL 5960687, at *9 (E.D. Wa. Oct. 18, 2020), 
available at https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.waed.90879/gov.uscourts.waed.90879.5
6.0.pdf. See also id. at *12. 
120 LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA, Ch. 1 (Constance Garrett, trans., 1998) (1878) (ebook) 
(“Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”) 
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good or service provokes a conscientious objection, the vendor need not 
appeal to past practice at all.  
In sum, Equal Access’s focus on comparing a requested product or 
service to those the vendor has offered, or would offer, is wrong-headed for 
many reasons. At bottom, it does not track what we, and the law, should care 
about. What matters is not that the vendor proceed consistently (assuming, 
contrary to what we have seen, that we can come up with a coherent, 
principled conception of what counts as being consistent); what matters is 
whether he is treating his patrons with the respect they deserve, no matter 
how the vendor dealt with others in the past. Equal Access does not provide 
an evaluation on that basis.  
III. THE MARKET AS A HATE-FREE ZONE 
How then should we conceptualize impermissible discrimination in the 
marketplace, especially once we recognize, as I have urged,121 that 
conscience has a legitimate role to play therein? I divide the analysis here 
between the provision of commercial goods and services, on the one hand, 
and public services, on the other. Thus, in Section III.A, I argue that 
anti-discrimination laws should in general trump conscience in the retail 
sphere. In Section III.B, I argue that the prohibition against discrimination 
is even stronger in the case of public service provision.  
But I do not adopt the Equal Access, or “holding-out,” policy critiqued 
above.122 Instead, in Section III.C, I defend refusals of service for products 
or services that would be used in projects involving hate. Paradigmatic here 
would be a refusal to supply goods or services for a KKK event, whether the 
KKK group is affiliated with a religious or secular supremacist group. I 
argue that we should see refusals that respond to the hateful projects of 
putative customers not as deviations from the egalitarian ethos of Equal 
Access but instead as continuous with and supportive of that ethos. In 
Section III.D, I consider the implications of this more nuanced policy of 
refusing service for public service providers. 
A. No Exemptions from Serving Protected Classes in Commerce 
To begin, it is worth noting that every exemption is an accommodation 
that recruits the community in promoting the personal commitments of the 
exempted party.123 Exemptions release the exempted party from one of his 
political obligations. The rest of us must continue to obey the law, even if 
 
121 See supra Part I. 
122 See supra Section I.B.2.  
123 See SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY AND THE LAW 158 
(2014) (defining accommodations as “social practice[s] in which we absorb some of the costs of others’ 
free and morally relevant choices in order to acknowledge, create room for, lift barriers to, facilitate, or 
convey a message about their choices”). 
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many of us might prefer not to.124 Further, the exemption may impose 
material costs on others. Given the potential third-party costs of an 
exemption, the typical case—seeking, for example, to be released from the 
draft, or Sunday Sabbath laws, or compulsory education—should then 
involve a balancing test, weighing (1) the objector’s burden of complying 
with the challenged legal requirement against (2) the strength of the 
obligation to obey laws of that kind and also the costs that an exemption 
would inflict on discrete third parties.125 But where the conscientious 
objector seeks an exemption from an anti-discrimination law, balancing has 
no place; the state should categorically refuse. 
This is because the logic of anti-discrimination protections cannot 
sustain exceptions. Again, these protections convey that, in the public 
sphere, discrimination is categorically wrong. The Court in Hobby Lobby 
recognized as much when it said that “prohibitions on racial discrimination” 
(which can be evaded only under strict scrutiny) “are precisely tailored to 
achieve th[e] critical goal [of eradicating racism].”126 In other words, the 
state cannot have a society wherein there is no racism if it sometimes permits 
racism.127 The same holds true for discrimination against members of other 
protected groups. 
Still, an exemption supporter might concede the importance of equality 
but then point out that equality can be cashed out in different ways. A regime 
in which everyone is entitled to turn others away on the basis of genuine and 
deeply held conscientious convictions enshrines a version of equality too: 
each of us is equally empowered to exercise their conscience as they see fit, 
which means, in particular, that each of us is equally empowered to decide, 
on the basis of conscience, whom they will or will not serve.128 Indeed, much 
 
124 See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The 
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1255 (1994) (noting 
that those with political or other non-religious commitments are not provided the same “governmental 
arrangements” as those with religious commitments). 
125 This is a gloss on Sepinwall, supra note 57, at 1966–79. For other work urging more serious 
attention to third parties, see Kara Loewentheil, When Free Exercise Is a Burden: Protecting “Third 
Parties” in Religious Accommodation Law, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 433, 470–74 (2014). 
126 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 733 (2014). 
127 In State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., a case where a florist had denied her services for a same-sex 
wedding, the Washington Supreme Court offered a definitive statement of this principle, noting that other 
courts had done the same:  
[t]his case is no more about access to flowers than civil rights cases in the 1960s were 
about access to sandwiches. As every other court to address the question has 
concluded, public accommodations laws do not simply guarantee access to goods or 
services. Instead, they serve a broader societal purpose: eradicating barriers to the 
equal treatment of all citizens in the commercial marketplace. Were we to carve out a 
patchwork of exceptions for ostensibly justified discrimination, that purpose would 
be fatally undermined. 
441 P.3d 1203, 1235 (Wash. 2019) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
128 See David Velleman, Comment, Same-Sex Weddings (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3) (draft on 
file with author). 
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current public accommodations law already operates in just this way, as we 
have seen.129  
I believe that there are at least four reasons to reject a regime that would 
allow every business carte blanche to decide, on conscientious grounds, 
whom to serve and whom to turn away. First, such a regime would court 
balkanization. Our world would devolve into a series of segregated enclaves, 
where each of us interacts only with others who share our beliefs, or our 
lifestyles, or our family values, or our race, religion, ethnicity, and so on. 
There is perhaps something comfortable about that world but there is also 
something troubling about it: for one thing, it prompts us to reduce people 
to the traits we do not like about them. The relevant fact about Charlie 
Craig—the customer turned away in Masterpiece—is his sexual orientation, 
not his job, his hobbies, or the fact that he brought his mother to the bakery 
to help him select a wedding cake. By contrast, compelled service might 
weaken some of the existing divisions. Thus, interacting with Craig, rather 
than turning him away, might have allowed Phillips, the baker, to see Craig 
more fully, in ways that would humanize him in Phillips’s eyes (and vice 
versa for the salutary effects that interacting with Phillips might have had 
for Craig).  
Second, we should recognize that a refusal of service has a different 
meaning than a government requirement to serve. For example, a wedding 
vendor’s refusal can legitimately be read as an expression of contempt—
and, for the reasons above, contempt not just for the same-sex couple’s 
choice to marry but for who they fundamentally are (marriage being central 
to a reasonable conception of the good life).130 On the other hand, if the 
 
129 See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
130 Cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015) (noting the “centrality of marriage to 
the human condition” and stating that “marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations”). 
Many of the state court wedding vendor decisions insist on denying a difference between refusing service 
for a same-sex wedding and refusing service on the basis of sexual orientation. See, e.g., Elane 
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 62 (N.M. 2013) (“[W]hen a law prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation, that law similarly protects conduct that is inextricably tied to sexual 
orientation.”). The position is consistent with the U.S. constitutional law doctrine rejecting distinctions 
between a protected status and conduct closely correlated with that status. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y 
v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 695 (2010); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (“When 
homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an 
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination . . . .”). Cf. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s 
Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993) (“A tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews.”). Interestingly, 
Britain’s Supreme Court has come out the other way, upholding the right of a baker to refuse to make a 
cake with a pro-same-sex marriage message, and insisting that “[a]lthough the person who requested the 
cake was gay, . . . the bakery owners’ refusal was based not on his sexual orientation, but on their 
Protestant faith’s opposition to gay marriage.” Ed O’Loughlin, Belfast Bakery Was Free to Refuse Baking 
Gay-Marriage Cake, Supreme Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2018, at A4. 
Sensitive to the sting of being turned away, Douglas Laycock has proposed “a requirement that 
merchants that refuse to serve same-sex couples announce that fact on their website or, for businesses 
with only a local service area, on a sign outside their premises.” Douglas Laycock, Afterword to SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 198–99 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony 
R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008). To the extent that the proposal would normalize 
opposition to same-sex marriage (which, for many, is tantamount to opposition to same-sex individuals), 
it is hard to see how the proposal would not wage a dignitary harm at least as severe. 
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government compels the vendor to provide service, the government does 
convey that it privileges equality over religious freedom. But I suspect that 
the expressive sting is less acute.131 For one thing, there is something 
especially confronting about having another person tell you, to your face, 
that you are not the kind of person he will serve.132 For another, the vendor 
can broadcast his opposition to same-sex marriage in other ways.  
Third, compelled service is dialogue-enhancing, whereas refusing 
service is not. If the vendor has a right to immediately eject those whom 
conscience will not permit him to serve, conversation will be foreclosed. But 
if the law instead compels the vendor to provide service, then there is at least 
in principle an opportunity for dialog to ensue. For example, if the baker in 
Masterpiece had been compelled by law to serve the gay couple, he could 
nonetheless have sought to have the couple release him from his legal 
obligation by explaining his objection.133 By the same token, the couple 
could perhaps have presented their relationship in ways that would have 
made it comfortable for the baker, and perhaps even worthy of his support.134 
We might see these in-store dialogs as the modern equivalent of the 
discursive exchanges of the town square of yore, where conversation and 
commerce flowed together, smoothing over difference.135  
Finally, and most significantly, a regime permitting conscientious 
exemptions risks creating minority oppression. It would be one thing if the 
conscientious commitments in question were idiosyncratic and distributed 
randomly across the population. For example, the bar on that corner will not 
 
131 But see Laycock, supra note 130, at 198 (“In my view, the right to one’s own moral integrity 
should generally trump the inconvenience of having to get the same service from another provider nearby. 
Requiring a merchant to perform services that violate his deeply held moral commitments is far more 
serious, different in kind and not just in degree, from mere inconvenience.”). 
132 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel  v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (stating that public 
accommodations laws “vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of 
equal access to public establishments”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 
160, 179 (1976) (stating that antidiscrimination laws “guarantee that ‘a dollar in the hands of a Negro 
will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a white man’”); 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 138–41 (2014). 
133 Addressing the wedding vendor cases specifically, Andrew Koppelman has defended 
conscientious exemptions for wedding vendors who oppose same-sex marriage on the ground that the 
LGBTQ community should be “magnanimous in victory.” Koppelman, supra note 74, at 628. But it is 
one thing for a person to exercise magnanimity of their own accord and quite another for the law 
effectively to impose it, by formally exempting vendors from their obligations under public 
accommodations laws.  
134 Cf. Support for Same-Sex Marriage Grows, Even Among Groups That Had Been Skeptical, PEW 
RSCH. CTR. (June 26, 2017), http://www.people-press.org/2017/06/26/support-for-same-sex-marriage-
grows-even-among-groups-that-had-been-skeptical/ (reporting on a 2017 survey finding changing 
attitudes in favor of gay marriage among members of the same demographic group—for example, “47% 
of white evangelical Millennials and Gen Xers—age cohorts born after 1964—favor same-sex marriage, 
up from 29% in March 2016”).  
135 See, e.g., ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEWS OF MARKET SOCIETY AND OTHER RECENT 
ESSAYS 139 (1986) (presenting the idea of “doux commerce,” which posits that increases in market 
activity promote a peaceful society and better manners). Cf. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. V. Robins, 447 
U.S. 74, 90 (1980) (“[S]hopping center owners . . . open[] their centers to the public at large, effectively 
replacing the State with respect to such traditional First Amendment forums as streets, sidewalks, and 
parks.”) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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serve Eagles fans; the bar on this corner will not serve lawyers; and that bar 
over there will not serve individuals with curly hair. Many people would 
then face occasional denials of service, but these would feel arbitrary and so 
not stigmatizing. But, if we allow people to deny service to members of 
protected classes, we can expect that many will, and the aggregate effect will 
be to create or reinforce stigma.136 Indeed, it is just to prevent this outcome 
that we have protected classes.137 
For all these reasons—the last especially—we should reject a policy 
under which business owners can turn anyone away so long as they do so on 
the basis of sincere conscientious convictions. 
B. No Exemptions for Public Service Providers  
If the state may interfere with private commercial entities in order to 
prohibit discrimination, one would have thought that, a fortiori, it may 
impose the anti-discrimination regulations to which it is bound on the 
agencies with whom it contracts to carry out its functions.138 But there is 
reason to think that a majority of Justices will find otherwise,139 and even 
progressives may be without the resources to impose a categorical ban on 
conscientious refusals.140  
As discussed above, the Supreme Court is poised to decide Fulton v. 
Philadelphia, in which Catholic Social Services challenges the city’s refusal 
to contract with CSS for the provision of foster care. The city insists that its 
foster agencies abide by its anti-discrimination law, which prohibits 
 
136 See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. V. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018) 
(noting that widespread exemptions would result “in a community-wide stigma inconsistent with the 
history and dynamics of civil rights laws that ensure equal access to goods, services, 
and public accommodations”); NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at, 215 n.64, 224 (2018) (citations 
omitted); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 30–31 (1996). 
137 The legislative history of Title II of the Civil Rights Act suggests this view. “[N]o action is more 
contrary to the spirit of our democracy and Constitution—or more rightfully resented by a Negro citizen 
who seeks only equal treatment—than the barring of that citizen from . . . public accommodations and 
facilities.” 109 CONG. REC. 11158 (1963). See also Jonathan Gingerich, Remixing Rawls: Constitutional 
Cultural Liberties in Liberal Democracies, 11 NE. U. L. REV. 401, 457 (2019) (“In almost all 
jurisdictions . . . businesses can arbitrarily exclude members of the public, refusing to . . . sell them goods 
or services, provided that the exclusion is not based on one of several grounds specifically proscribed in 
a public accommodation statute (such as race, gender, age, sexual orientation, marital status, and 
employment by the military).”). 
138 See, e.g., Kindall, supra note 46 (“The First Amendment does not require governments to use 
private contractors who refuse to provide the contracted services on a nondiscriminatory basis.”). For an 
interesting history of how social workers and others administering foster care violated state regulations, 
as a matter of conscientious conviction, in order to place foster children with LGBTQ+ parents at a time 
when the rules officially disqualified them, see Marie-Amélie George, Agency Nullification: Defying 
Bans on Gay and Lesbian Foster and Adoptive Parents, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 363 (2016). 
139 See, e.g., Natalie Hope McDonald, With Fulton v. Philadelphia, U.S. Supreme Court is Poised 
to Decide a New LGBT Rights Issue, PHILLY VOICE (Nov. 14, 2020), https://www.phillyvoice.com/us-
supreme-court-fulton-vs-philadephia-lgbt-right-catholic-social-services-discrimination/ (noting that 
there are now six conservative Justices on the Court and they seem to be leaning in favor of CSS). 
140 See infra text accompanying notes 144–50.  
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discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and CSS will not certify 
same-sex couples as a matter of its religious convictions. 
The most compelling reason CSS has for contesting the city’s refusal to 
contract alleges that the refusal involves an unconstitutional condition: the 
city requires CSS either to abandon (or speak against) its religious beliefs, 
as a condition of providing foster care.141 Respondents142 and their progressive 
supporters143 deny that there is an unconstitutional condition here. But the 
Respondents’ position sits uncomfortably alongside the position progressives 
have taken in a different set of cases—this one involving challenges to state 
laws that would deny government contracts to entities that support the 
Boycott, Divest, and Sanction (BDS) movement against Israel.144 In the latter 
set of cases, progressives have argued that the state imposes an 
unconstitutional condition when it requires that entities contracting with the 
state forswear support for the BDS movement.145 On its face, there appears 
 
141 See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 34, Fulton, No. 19–123 (“The City’s actions here 
place unconstitutional conditions on CSS’s first amendment activities: the City is threatening to deny 
CSS the ability to provide foster care to Philadelphia children unless CSS does and says things it believes 
it should not.”). 
A second reason CSS contests the city’s seeking to bind it to the city’s anti-discrimination law 
seems to relate to the history of foster care in Philadelphia. CSS worked as a foster agency long before 
the city adopted the mandate of administering all foster care work. See Brief for Petitioners at *3–6, 
Fulton, No. 19–123. So CSS seems to see itself not as an agent of the city but instead as continuing on 
in the private work it has long been doing, while helping the city fulfill the city’s mandate. See id.; 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Fulton, No. 19–123. But the relevance of its history is subject to 
question on two grounds. First, as Justice Kagan intimated at oral argument, it is not as if CSS would 
abandon its insistence that it had a Free Exercise right to discriminate against same-sex couples if CSS 
had only begun to serve foster children after Philadelphia took charge of foster care. See Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 23–24 (showing Justice Kagan questioning lawyer for CSS on this point). Second, CSS 
seems to operate with a misconception about what its history should entail. With the expansion of state 
power over the twentieth century, government has extended itself into lots of realms previously the 
province of private entities. But that does not mean that the government must allow these private entities 
to operate according to their own rules. Cf. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 885 (1990) (entitling religious objectors to exemptions from generally applicable rules would make 
every person “a law unto himself,” impairing the ability of government to carry out its functions) (quoting 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878)). To the contrary, once the government 
legitimately claims a domain as its own, it is empowered to supplant the private agencies’ rules with its 
own, so long as it subjects all of them to the same rules. So while CSS may have a venerable history of 
foster care—it almost surely warrants great praise for undertaking this important work before the state 
recognized its responsibility to do so—it cannot leverage that history to act in ways that the government 
has good reason to prohibit. 
142 See Brief for City Respondents at 19,  (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 632 (1943) for the proposition that “persons who ‘voluntarily enroll’ in a government program ‘may 
not on ground of conscience refuse [its] conditions’”).  
143 See, e.g., Kindall, supra note 46; William M. Pinzler, ‘Fulton v. Philadelphia’: A Conflict 
Between Anti-Discrimination Laws and the Free Exercise Clause, LAW.COM (Nov. 03, 2020, 01:00 PM), 
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/11/03/fulton-v-philadelphia-a-conflict-between-anti-
discrimination-laws-and-the-free-exercise-clause/?slreturn=20201108080354 (“CSS is free to express 
itself outside the foster care program, and thus it is arguably not an unconstitutional condition.”). 
144 See, e.g., Amawi v. Pflugerville Indep. Sch. Dist., 373 F. Supp. 3d 717 (W.D. Tex. 2019); Jordahl 
v. Brnovich, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (D. Ariz. 2019). 
145 For commentary arguing that the challenged laws violate the First Amendment, see, for example, 
Timothy Cuffman, Note, The State Power to Boycott a Boycott: The Thorny Constitutionality of State 
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to be a tension between the two positions: Philadelphia may refuse to 
contract with entities, like CSS, that discriminate, but Texas, Arizona, and others 
may not refuse to contract with entities that support the BDS movement. 
One might think that the two cases are distinguishable because there is 
nothing discriminatory about the BDS movement (notwithstanding the fact 
that some states have sought to defend their anti-BDS laws as efforts to 
combat anti-Semitism).146 I am inclined to agree that the BDS movement 
targets Israeli policies and not the Jewish people, so it is not anti-Semitic. 
Still, it seems doubtful that all of those who challenge the anti-BDS laws 
would abandon their challenges if it turned out that the BDS movement was 
avowedly anti-Semitic. The ACLU, for example, which has led the 
challenge against many of these state laws,147 sees the laws as impinging on 
free speech, and we know that the ACLU’s robust protection for free speech 
does not depend on the content of the speech at issue.148 
If it is safe to assume that opposition to the anti-BDS laws would persist 
even if these laws aimed at combatting anti-Semitic speech, then in both the 
anti-BDS cases and Fulton, we would face a government decision not to 
contract with entities that discriminate. And if it were permissible for the 
government to act on this decision as regards CSS, why would it not also be 
permissible for the government to act on this decision as regards the entities 
challenging the anti-BDS laws? The answer, I believe, turns on the fact that 
CSS would discriminate in the course of the activities it would carry out on 
the government’s behalf, whereas the anti-BDS laws deny contracts to 
entities no matter how close or remote the entities’ support for BDS is to 
their government work. That is, CSS seeks to fulfill the government’s 
functions in a discriminatory manner. The entities denied contracts under the 
anti-BDS laws need only have “engaged in . . . a boycott of goods or services 
 
Anti-BDS Laws, 57 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 115, 134–62 (2018); Recent Cases–Recent Legislation, 
129 HARV. L. REV. 2029 (2016) (discussing S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-35-5300 (2015)); Nathaniel Sobel, 
Breaking Down the Combating BDS Act of 2019 and First Amendment Challenges to State Anti-BDS 
Laws, LAWFARE  (Mar. 19, 2019, 7:14 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/breaking-down-combating-
bds-act-2019-and-first-amendment-challenges-state-anti-bds-laws (“[A] group of leading First 
Amendment scholars [ ] argue that boycotting Israel qualifies as protected speech. ‘This is an easy First 
Amendment case,’ they told the court.”); Noah Feldman, Is the Anti-BDS Bill Constitutional? Yes, 
But …, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2019, 2:46 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-
06/anti-bds-bill-approved-by-senate-avoids-first-amendment-questions (There is . . . a powerful 
constitutional argument to be made that the state [anti-BDS] laws violate free speech.”).  
146 See, e.g., Note, Wielding Antidiscrimination Law to Suppress the Movement for Palestinian 
Rights, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1360, 1365–66 (cataloging states that have marshaled this defense). 
147 See Brian Hauss, Laws Suppressing Boycotts of Israel Don’t Prevent Discrimination — They 
Violate Civil Liberties, ACLU (Feb. 22, 2019, 5:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/laws-
suppressing-boycotts-israel-dont-prevent-discrimination-they-violate-civil. 
148 See Freedom of Expression - ACLU Position Paper, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/freedo
m-expression-aclu-position-paper (last visited Jan. 8, 2020). 
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from Israel”;149 the laws do not require that the boycott relate to the services 
the boycotter would perform for the state.150  
To be sure, Philadelphia would violate CSS’s constitutional rights if it 
prohibited CSS from speaking against same-sex marriage as a condition of 
CSS’s contract with the city. So too would Philadelphia violate CSS’s right 
if the contract instead required CSS to forswear activities promoting 
traditional families in domains other than those that the contract governs 
(e.g., if it required CSS to dispense condoms at its after-school programs 
even though the after-school programs were run independent of the city). 
But the contract does nothing like either of these things. Instead, it simply 
requires that CSS abide by the same anti-discrimination principles that bind 
the city, and only where and for the activities CSS undertakes on 
Philadelphia’s behalf. 
The important feature, then, is not which set of beliefs is at issue. It is 
whether that set of beliefs will entail a refusal of service in the course of the 
service agency’s work on the government’s behalf. States might well be 
within their rights to insist that their contractors not boycott one or more 
countries while carrying out the states’ functions. Philadelphia is surely 
within its rights to insist that CSS not boycott LGBTQ+ individuals while 
carrying out Philadelphia’s foster care work. More generally, where a 
private entity steps into the government’s shoes, its license to discriminate 
may be no broader than the government’s. 
C. Hate Has No Home Here 
If, as the last two Sections have sought to show, carte blanche 
discrimination is a non-starter, does that leave no room for conscience in 
commerce at all? This Section takes up the suggestion in Parts I and II that 
we need not adopt a categorical Equal Access policy in order to secure the 
ends of anti-discrimination laws, or egalitarianism more broadly construed. 
It champions the business owner’s right to deny service where the denial is 
not predicated on the would-be customer’s protected characteristics. In 
particular, this Section aims to protect storeowners from having to do 
business with those who promote hate or oppression, even when that hate or 
 
149 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-393.01(1)(a) (West, Westlaw current through Second Reg. Sess. of 
the Fifty-Fourth Leg.). Similar language can be found in other state statutes. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 332.065(5)(A) (2019); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2270.001 et seq. (West, Westlaw through the 
end of the 2019 Reg. Sess. of the 86th Leg.)  
150 Thus, for example, in one of the challenges, a speech pathologist was unable to renew her 
contract with a public school district because she refused to sign a certification declaring that she would 
not boycott Israel while the contract was in effect. She described her BDS participation in this way: She 
chose to “buy[] Palestinian olive oil and refus[ed] to buy the Sabra brand of hummus because of the 
company's connections to Israel.” Amawi v. Pflugerville Indep. Sch. Dist., 373 F. Supp. 3d 717, 731–32 
(W.D. Tex. 2019). Clearly, these buying decisions have nothing to do with her speech pathology work. 
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oppression is mandated by religion. In this way, the proposal aims to 
vindicate both conscience and equality. 
Recall the hypothetical around underage marriage.151 To flesh it out 
further, imagine one Mrs. Lovett, of Mrs. Lovett’s Pies and Cakes, who is 
approached by an elderly man and young woman and asked to bake a cake 
for their upcoming nuptials. In conversation, it comes out that the man, 
Judge Turpin, is an upstanding member of the community while Joanna, his 
bride-to-be, is fifteen.152 When Judge Turpin leaves the room, Joanna 
confesses that she has no romantic feelings for Turpin, but she is consigned 
to go ahead with the marriage as her parents support it, she believes that they 
know best, and, at any rate, their religion encourages girls to get married 
before age sixteen to men who have already established themselves.153 
Mrs. Lovett, appalled at the thought of underage marriage, tells the 
couple that the law will permit no such thing and she cannot possibly furnish 
a cake for an illegal marriage. But Mrs. Lovett is wrong, as Judge Turpin 
informs her: in all but three states, underage children can be married off—
typically, so long as the couple can obtain the approval of a judge or the 
 
151 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
152 Those familiar with Thomas Peckett Prest’s Penny Dreadful novel, The String of Pearls (1846), 
or its contemporary adaptation as Sweeney Todd, The Demon Barber of Fleet Street by Christopher 
Godfrey Bond (1970) (play) and then Stephen Sondheim and Hugh Wheeler (under the pen name Patrick 
Quentin) (1979) (musical), will recognize the characters’ names and the rough modification of the 
storyline for purposes of the hypothetical. Perhaps most significantly, while Turpin is Joanna’s adopted 
father in the story, I omit that detail here so as not to prejudice the case against underage marriage. 
Readers may further assume that no human beings are harmed in the making of any of the pies or cakes 
of the Mrs. Lovett who appears here. 
153 See, e.g., Lucy Anna Gray, Lifting the Veil: Why Children Are Still Getting Married in America, 
INDEPENDENT (Apr. 16, 2020, 8:45 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/child-
marriage-us-states-america-minimum-age-bride-girls-a9467121.html (reporting that close to 14,0000 
children marry in the U.S. each year, some as young as twelve years old; 87% of them are girls and 86% 
of those girls marry adults—with as many as sixty years separating husband and wife); Carol Kuruvilla, 
In Some Evangelical Circles, Grown Men Pursuing Teens Isn’t All That Unusual, HUFFINGTON POST   
(Nov. 14, 2017, 1:13 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/roy-moore-evangelicalism_us_5a05f
4f8e4b0e37d2f37573d (“[Y]oung marriage is encouraged in some Christian communities because 
marrying young reduces the chance of people having sex outside of marriage, and increases the 
possibility of having more children. (These communities don’t have a monopoly on encouraging young 
marriage for religious reasons, of course; the same thing can be found in certain Jewish and Muslim 
traditions.)”). But cf. Julie Zauzmer, Roy Moore Allegations Prompt Reflections on Fundamentalist 
Culture in Which Some Christian Men Date Teens, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2017, 1:57 PM), (“Randy 
Brinson, an influential evangelical pastor who ran against Moore in his primary race in this election, said 
that the evangelical Christians he knows in Alabama would generally not approve of . . . a relationship 
[between a thirty-one-year-old man and a fourteen-year-old girl].”). For the general state of underage 
marriage and the laws surrounding it, see TAHIRIH JUST. CTR., FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS: HOW 
LAWS ALLOW CHILD MARRIAGE TO HAPPEN IN TODAY’S AMERICA 2 (2017), http://www.tahirih.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/TahirihChildMarriageReport.pdf (listing only three states—Virginia, Texas, 
and New York—that limit marriage to adults); Anjali Tsui, In Fight Over Child Marriage Laws, States 
Resist Calls for a Total Ban, FRONTLINE (July 6, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/in-
fight-over-child-marriage-laws-states-resist-calls-for-a-total-ban/ (“No state has gone as far as to bar 
marriage for all minors, but three have come close: Texas, Virginia and New York.”). But see Zauzmer, 
supra (“Every state allows youths under 18 to marry in certain circumstances, such as with parental 
consent or judicial approval.”).  
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underage party’s parents.154 Colorado, Mrs. Lovett’s place of business, is 
one such state.155 Further, in Colorado, emancipation from one’s parents is 
automatic once an underage person marries.156 And statutory rape laws do 
not prohibit sex between married individuals.157 As such, Judge Turpin and 
Joanna’s marriage fits within the legal parameters. In addition, because their 
religion dictates unions of this kind, the state would be especially loath to 
intervene.158 Mrs. Lovett nonetheless refuses to supply the cake, citing her 
conscientious objection to underage marriage. Mrs. Lovett’s bakery is a 
public accommodation and, like Mr. Phillips (the baker in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop v. Colorado) she is subject to Colorado’s public accommodations 
law, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion.159 Must Mrs. 
Lovett, like Mr. Phillips, set conscience aside and provide the cake? 
Notice the parallels between Mrs. Lovett’s and Mr. Phillips’s opposition 
to providing service. Both respond to the nature of the marriage that is to be 
celebrated: Mrs. Lovett opposes underage marriage and Mr. Phillips opposes 
same-sex marriage. Mrs. Lovett might well have contended that she would 
bake just about any celebration cake for members of Judge Turpin’s 
religious community; she is just unwilling to contribute to an underage 
marriage. In a similar vein, Mr. Phillips, along with other vendors who 
oppose gay marriage,160 argues that his refusal is not directed at gay or 
lesbian individuals; he would bake cakes for a gay person’s birthday, just 
not for a same-sex marriage.161  
Of course, Mrs. Lovett could say that her objection is to any form of 
child marriage, not religious child marriage per se. She would refuse to 
 
154 Zauzmer, supra note 153.  
155 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-108 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.). 
156 A minor under the age of 16 may enter into a marriage so long as she has the consent of a legally 
responsible parent and the approval of a judge, id. § 14-2-108(1), but only if the court makes a finding 
that “the underage party is capable of assuming the responsibilities of marriage and the marriage would 
serve the underage party’s best interests.” Id. § 14-2-108(2)(a). See also Colorado Legal Ages Law, 
FINDLAW (Mar. 9, 2018), http://statelaws.findlaw.com/colorado-law/colorado-legal-ages-laws.html 
(“Colorado doesn’t have an emancipation . . . statute. Emancipation generally occurs when a child 
reaches the age of majority (21), but can occur earlier due to marriage . . . .”).   
157  In general, “sex between a married couple in which at least one party is under the age of consent 
cannot be prosecuted under the law.” CAROLYN E. COCCA, JAILBAIT: THE POLITICS OF STATUTORY RAPE 
LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2004). See generally Age of Consent & Sexual Abuse Laws Around the 
World, AGEOFCONSENT.NET, https://www.ageofconsent.net/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2019) (insert 
explanatory parenthetical). In Colorado, marriage is a defense to a statutory rape charge. COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 18-3-402(1)(d) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.). 
158  See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 39, at 285 (“[I]f the relevant religious community has norms 
with respect to who may marry within its traditions—and virtually all traditions have such norms—the 
state is disabled from substituting its judgment for that of the faith community on the content of those 
religious norms.”). 
159 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.). 
160 See, e.g., Barronelle Stutzman, Why a Friend Is Suing Me: The Arlene’s Flowers Story, SEATTLE 
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2015, 4:23 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/why-a-good-friend-is-suing-me-
the-arlenes-flowers-story/.  
161 Alex Swoyer, Supreme Court Case on Same-Sex Wedding Cakes: Artistic Expression vs. Civil 
Rights, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2017), https://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/nov/28/jack-phillips-
argument-same-sex-wedding-cakes-set-/.  
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supply a cake to a secular couple where there was a significant difference in 
age between the two marrying parties, one of them was underage, and the 
underage party did not consent. In that way, one might think Mrs. Lovett 
could avoid a charge of religious discrimination. But the claim would be of 
no avail: just as prohibitions on sexual orientation discrimination entail 
prohibitions on discrimination aimed at same-sex marriage, so too 
prohibitions on religious discrimination would entail prohibitions on 
discrimination aimed at religiously mandated (or promoted) marriage. One 
cannot plausibly sustain a distinction between refusing someone because of 
their religion and refusing to cater to a central aspect of their religion. Were 
it otherwise, we would have to take at face value a baker’s claim that he 
could not be charged with anti-Semitism for refusing to provide a cake for a 
Bar or Bat Mitzvah since he would happily sell Jewish customers any of the 
birthday cakes he keeps in stock.162 
How ought the law respond to the claims of these bakers? On its face, it 
looks to be difficult to distinguish the two. Nonetheless this Section aims to 
argue that Mrs. Lovett may turn away Judge Turpin and his underage bride 
even while Mr. Phillips may not refuse to provide cakes for gay weddings.  
To begin, consider again the two cakes with anti-gay messages that 
Azucar bakery refused to provide to William Jack. Recall that the Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission held that Marjorie Silva, the owner of Azucar, did 
not violate Colorado’s public accommodations law in refusing because Silva 
would not have supplied anti-gay cakes to anyone.163 At the same time, the 
Commission also held that Phillips, the baker in Masterpiece, did 
discriminate impermissibly in refusing a wedding cake to the gay couple, 
since the baker regularly sold wedding cakes to opposite-sex couples.164  In 
other words, and in keeping with Equal Access, Silva merely chose the 
products she would sell, while Phillips nefariously chose the people he 
would serve. 
I believe the Commission reached the right result, albeit for the wrong 
reason. A better strategy would pick up on a different asymmetry between 
the requests made of Silva and Phillips. Jack, the fundamentalist Christian 
customer whom Silva turned away, sought a cake with a message 
communicating animus toward gay and lesbian people. In contrast, the cake 
Craig and Mullins sought from Phillips did not convey a message whose aim 
was to denigrate religion. Craig and Mullins wanted a cake celebrating their 
marriage. As such, their commission was not a true counterpart to William 
Jack’s. The true counterpart to the cake Silva was asked to bake would instead 
 
162 See supra note 130 and accompanying text (noting that discrimination against same-sex marriage 
is discrimination against sexual orientation). See also infra text accompanying note 178.  
163 Corvino, supra note 113. 
164 Id. 
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have been a cake with one or more religious figures X-ed out or a cake with a 
message from a venerated source decrying religion or religious individuals.165  
Recognizing the distinction between these commissions points the way 
to a more general policy: commercial enterprises may, in the spirit of “hate 
has no home here,” refuse commissions communicating hate. Indeed, 
Marjorie Silva, the baker who refused to supply the cakes with anti-gay 
biblical language, described her reasoning in just this way: “If [a customer] 
wants to hate people, he can hate them not here in my bakery.”166 Or to put 
the policy in more general terms: businesses may refuse to supply goods or 
services that would be used in projects promoting animus toward individuals 
or groups on the basis of their protected characteristics.167 
Because animus is the only justifiable predicate for a refusal of service 
that would otherwise target a protected class, the policy offers ready 
protection for same-sex couples who would seek goods or services for their 
weddings.168 A marrying same-sex couple expresses each member’s love for 
the other. As such, the policy would not countenance a refusal to serve a 
same-sex couple, however conscientious that refusal was.   
But what about serving individuals who do seek to promote hate?  
Consider a case where someone who is not a member of a protected class 
seeks a good or service for a project promoting hate—for example, a 
Neo-Nazi approaches an African American baker to order a cake denigrating 
African Americans for an upcoming Neo-Nazi convention. Now consider 
the distribution of entitlements. The state cannot, consistent with the First 
Amendment, prohibit Neo-Nazis from undertaking their activities, however 
hostile to minority races and religions those activities may be.169 At the same 
time, in virtually no jurisdiction would Neo-Nazis be taken to be members 
of a protected class.170 On a narrow reading of public accommodations 
 
165 For this reason, Phillips’s lawyer before the Supreme Court was just mistaken when she 
contended that the Free Speech Clause “protects the lesbian graphic designer who doesn’t want to design 
for the Westboro Baptist Church, as much as it protects Mr. Phillips.” Gay Wedding Cake Meets Faith 
at U.S. Supreme Court, RICHMOND FREE PRESS (Dec. 8, 2017, 6:56 AM), http://m.richmondfreepress.c
om/news/2017/dec/08/gay-wedding-cake-meets-faith-us-supreme-court/. The Westboro Baptist Church 
promotes hate; marrying gay couples do not. 
166 Todd Starnes, Colorado Double Standard: Bakers Should Not Be Forced to Make Anti-Gay 
Cakes, FOX NEWS (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/colorado-double-standard-bakers-
should-not-be-forced-to-make-anti-gay-cakes. 
167 Ought the principle apply to animus not based on protected characteristics? I am inclined to say 
yes. A baker might reasonably refuse to bake a cake for a party of the “we-hate-fat-people club,” or even 
for a party dissing her favorite sports team. Within the confines of this Article, however, I restrict the 
defense of the “hate has no home here” policy to hate directed toward members of protected classes 
because of their protected characteristics. I seek to leverage the converging aims of refusals of service 
for these projects and anti-discrimination laws. I leave a defense of a broader hate-based exemption 
policy for another day.  
168 See supra note 12 for examples of pending or decided wedding vendor cases. 
169 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (vindicating the right of the KKK 
to hold events promoting hate so long as those events did not prompt “imminent lawless action”). 
170 Seattle’s public accommodations law is unusual insofar as it includes “political ideology” among 
the impermissible grounds of discrimination in places of public accommodation. Civil Rights 
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statutes, where they protect only members with the enumerated characteristics, 
the baker could freely turn the Neo-Nazi away on any grounds.171  
On the other hand, a more expansive reading of public accommodations 
laws would require service for “[a]ll persons,”172 with protected classes 
enumerated to identify not an exclusive list of people against whom 
businesses may not discriminate—again, anti-discrimination norms apply to 
everyone on this reading—but instead to underscore that it is especially 
wrong to discriminate against members of historically disadvantaged 
groups.173 On this reading, the public accommodations law protects the 
Neo-Nazi, all else equal. The important point to note is that, when a putative 
customer desires a product or service for the purposes of promoting hate, all 
is not equal. 
We saw in Part I that it is not unreasonable for a vendor to see herself as 
implicated morally in the projects to which a customer will put the good or 
service the vendor provides. The fact that she would feel complicit is not a 
sufficient reason to exempt her from a requirement to serve. But the law has 
special reason to attend to conscientious objections to serving customers 
who are engaged in hate promotion, especially where the targets of that hate 
include the very individuals whom anti-discrimination laws seek to protect. 
After all, there is something awkward, if not also counterproductive and 
even perverse, in having an anti-discrimination law compel someone, like 
our African American baker, to help further the Neo-Nazis’ project of 
directing animus toward his own people. By contrast, when the African 
American baker excludes the Neo-Nazi, he is acting in a way that is 
continuous with the aims of the law that the civil rights commission is 
empowered to enforce. If refusals of service are permissible anywhere, they 
should be permissible here. 
To get a better handle on the scope of permissible refusals, consider, 
first, that the result would be the same whether or not the cake the Neo-Nazi 
requested contained a message. The baker could reasonably see himself as 
promoting hate were the Neo-Nazi to have asked him for nothing but 
 
Enforcement, SEATTLE.GOV, https://www.seattle.gov/civilrights/civil-rights (last visited Aug. 11, 2020). 
To the extent that Neo-Nazism constitutes a political ideology, our baker might be out of luck in Seattle. 
Elsewhere, he is free to turn the Neo-Nazi away. For an exhaustive list of public accommodations statutes 
extending beyond the traditional suspect classes, see Sepper, supra note 39, at 639 n.25. 
171 Gingerich, supra note 137, at 457.  
172 Civil Rights Act of 1974, tit. II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a). 
173 I am grateful to Seana Shiffrin for pointing me to this distinction. Joseph Singer urges something 
similar in No Right, supra note 6, at 1412–16. The view can be traced back to William Blackstone: “[I]f 
an inn-keeper, or other victualler, hangs out a sign and opens his house for travelers, it is an implied 
engagement to entertain all persons who travel that way . . . .” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 166 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1902); see also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 
226, 296 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“Underlying the congressional discussions, and at the heart 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection, was the assumption that the State by 
statute or by ‘the good old common law’ was obligated to guarantee all citizens access to places of public 
accommodation.”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Common Carriers and the Common Law, 13 AM. L. 
REV. 609, 615 (1879) (discussing “the general obligation of those exercising a public or ‘common’ 
business to practi[c]e their art on demand”). 
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unadorned, generic baked goods for the Neo-Nazi convention.174 Second, 
any baker, of any skin color, race, ethnicity, and so on, could exercise the 
right in question. Everyone has the right to refuse to promote hate. 
Insofar as the Neo-Nazi case does not involve a customer who is a 
member of a protected class, that case is a relatively easy one. But suppose 
now that our Neo-Nazi is replaced by an adherent of Christian Identity, a 
KKK group that subscribes to “a unique anti[-S]emitic and racist 
theology.”175 For this KKK member, hate is mandated by his religion.176 And 
suppose further that this KKK member approaches the same African 
American baker, this time requesting a generic cake for a Christian Identity 
KKK event. This looks to pose a problem for the baker’s ability to oppose 
the commission. Would turning the KKK member away constitute 
impermissible discrimination on the basis of religion? 
One thought would be to have the baker insist that he is not denying 
service because of the KKK member’s religion, but instead because of the 
event at which the KKK member would serve the cake—again, a KKK 
convention. But we have already seen that a similar strategy is unavailing 
for the wedding vendor who would deny service to a same-sex couple177—
there is no distinguishing status from conduct where the status mandates the 
conduct or the conduct embodies the status.178  
Here is a different way of arguing that the Christian KKK case is not 
relevantly different from the secular Neo-Nazi case. Both parties are 
engaged in the same conduct—the promotion of white supremacy. If the 
state were to treat the two cases differently, because of the KKK’s 
connection to religion, one could charge the state with an Establishment 
Clause violation.179 Or one might see in the state’s more favorable treatment 
of the Christian KKK member a violation of a principle of “equal regard,”180 
which holds that “no members of our political community ought to be 
devalued on account of the spiritual [or non-spiritual] foundations of their 
important commitments and projects.”181 On either way of understanding 
what the state may permissibly do, the result in the Christian KKK case may 
not be different from the result reached in the Neo-Nazi case. So, if the 
 
174 Cf. Stolzenberg, supra note 66, at 748. 
175 Christian Identity, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-
files/ideology/christian-identity (last visited Aug. 11, 2020). 
176 See, e.g., supra note 17. 
177 See supra text accompanying note 162. 
178 See supra notes 130 and 162. 
179 See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the 
Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
343, 356–61 (2014); Micah Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Obamacare and Religion and Arguing Off 
the Wall, SLATE (Nov. 26, 2013, 2:32 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2013/11/obamacare-
birth-control-mandate-lawsuit-how-a-radical-argument-went-mainstream.html. 
180 Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 124, at 1282–1288. 
181 CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 4 (2007). 
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vendor may refuse to provide the cake for the Neo-Nazi convention, then the same 
logic permits him to refuse to provide the cake for the Christian KKK convention. 
The foregoing offers a principle that, unlike Equal Access, does not 
begin and end with whether the vendor offers a particular kind of good to 
one customer but not another. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the 
vendor can credibly claim that he does not wish to support a particular 
project. That is, conscientious businesses may attend to the uses to which 
their goods and services will be put. And on the thought that “hate has no 
home here,” in conjunction with the ethos of anti-discrimination laws, the 
state may permit conscientious vendors to refuse to supply their goods or 
services for projects involving hate. 
I want to take the additional step of enlarging the understanding of hate 
that can serve as a predicate for refusing service. The relevant notion of hate 
should encompass not just events whose explicit aim is an assertion or 
celebration of the supremacy of one identity-based group relative to another, 
but also those that have the effect of creating or perpetuating supremacy. 
Therein lie the seeds of Mrs. Lovett’s right to turn away Judge Turpin and 
his underage bride.  
Underage marriage is a tool for the oppression of women. In the vast 
majority of these unions, the husband is an adult and the wife is a minor. She 
is frequently below the age of consent, so her consent is not sought; instead, 
as we have seen, a parent or judge will substitute their consent for hers.182 
Even where a state does recognize her consent, we might worry that that 
consent is not meaningful because of her youth. In many of these unions, the 
wife is young enough that, were her husband to have had sex with her before 
they were married, he could have been charged with statutory rape.183 So the 
unconsented-to marriage transforms sexual assault into a non-offense. 
Further, in many states, the wife—while deemed old enough to marry—is 
not yet old enough to retain a lawyer or represent herself in court in order to 
seek a divorce.184 It is not difficult to see how these arrangements would 
satisfy at least some definitions of domination.185  
One might contend that in many of these cases, the couple’s religion 
commands or at least encourages the marriage. In such cases, neither the 
 
182 See supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text. 
183 See, e.g., Nicholas Kristof, Opinion, 11 Years Old, a Mom, and Pushed to Marry Her Rapist in 
Florida, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/26/opinion/sunday/it-was-
forced-on-me-child-marriage-in-the-us.html. 
184 See, e.g., Charlotte Alter, Why It’s Still Legal for Underage Girls to Marry in the U.S., TIME 
(June 1, 2017, 5:39 AM), https://time.com/4800808/why-its-still-legal-for-underage-girls-to-marry-in-
the-u-s/. 
185 See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 31–33 (1990). Marci 
Hamilton, a children’s rights advocate, has forcefully condemned fundamentalist religious communities 
in which the boys are “groomed to be rapists” while the young girls are “groomed to be victims,” and 
where men engage in polygamous marriages with underage girls. Marci Hamilton, Why the Texas 
Supreme Court’s Ruling Regarding the FLDS Mothers Is Significantly More Protective of the Children 
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couple nor the community views the marriage as an assertion of male 
supremacy, or at least not in the invidious way that the term generally tracks. 
While outsiders might construe it as oppressive—perhaps even as a form of 
female bondage186—that is not how the couple, or their community, views it.187  
It should not be surprising that the community views these marriages as 
benign. If the religion’s acknowledged purpose were instead, for example, 
to enslave the community’s female members, the state might well step in to 
prevent this form of religious exercise.188 But it is hardly fanciful or 
intolerant for someone who does not share the community’s beliefs to find 
underage marriage troubling, any more than it would be intolerant to 
condemn a religious group’s promotion of murder even if murder were 
mandated by the group’s authoritative religious texts.189 
The question then is whether the state may compel those who oppose 
underage marriage to foster it, whether by contributing to underage 
weddings or in some other way. The answer, I think, is this: as with the 
Christian KKK commission, the fact that the oppressive activity has a 
religious basis makes no difference to Mrs. Lovett’s rights. Mrs. Lovett can 
forswear selling cakes to any couple with an underage bride—were Jerry 
Lee Lewis to have entered her store requesting a cake for his upcoming 
nuptials to his thirteen-year-old fiancée, Mrs. Lovett would have refused him 
too. And if Judge Turpin, now betrothed to a fifteen-year-old boy, were to 
request a wedding cake from Jack Phillips, Phillips would be well within his 
rights to refuse the commission—so long as his refusal was based on the 
youth of the betrothed and not the sexual orientation of the couple. 
To summarize the proposed policy so far: no business may discriminate 
on the basis of a protected characteristic. But the law should permit an 
exception for businesses that choose to deny service to any individual or 
group that would use the business’s wares for a project or event directing 
hate toward members of a protected class because of their protected 
 




186 See generally Ajwang’ Warria, Forced Child Marriages as a Form of Child Trafficking, 79 
CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 274 (2017) (likening child marriage to “[a] life of bondage”). 
187 For a literary example on this point, see ATWOOD, supra note 13 (describing the anticipation of 
a young girl over her upcoming nuptials to a prominent, older man, against the backdrop of a religious 
society whose oppression Atwood aims to condemn). 
188 Cf. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (“[I]f a wife religiously believed it was 
her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the 
civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice?”). 
189 Cf. Thomas C. Berg, Religious Exemptions and Third-Party Harms, 17 FED. SOC’Y REV. 50, 58 
(2016), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/religious-exemptions-and-third-party-harms (“No one 
argues today that religious freedom shields acts causing such basic harms” as “murder, rape, [and] theft.”). 
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characteristics.190 I leave open the question of whether the law should permit 
other refusals of service.  
Further, and importantly, unlike the question of whether the vendor 
would take herself to be complicit, the question of what counts as “hate” is 
one the state has the prerogative to answer. That is, the vendor can judge a 
particular event as hate-promoting, and she can decide, as a matter of 
conscience, whether she wants to contribute to it. But if she refuses, the state 
should countenance her refusal on the policy proposed here only if the event 
for which her goods or services are sought would assert or perpetuate the 
inferiority of a protected class. That way of formulating the policy echoes 
the construction of anti-subordination that the Supreme Court has 
articulated,191 as well as the one used by the federal government when 
prosecuting hate crimes.192 
Notice that the difference between the policy articulated here and Equal 
Access is not merely that the former permits some refusals of service in order 
to avoid felt complicity in hate or oppression while the latter would not. It 
is, more significantly, that the policy defended here is, in fact, more 
consonant with anti-discrimination norms than Equal Access. Recall that 
Equal Access prohibits a vendor from denying one customer a product if the 
vendor would be willing to sell that product to a different customer.193 
However, the policy here takes sameness of the product to be irrelevant, and 
respect for equality to be paramount. Thus, if a vendor is willing to provide 
a wedding cake for a secular underage marriage, she may not refuse a 
 
190 Putting the principle in this way naturally raises the question of whether the owner of the Red 
Hen restaurant was within her rights to eject Sarah Huckabee Sanders, President Trump’s press secretary. 
See supra note 10 and accompanying text. The Red Hen’s owner later explained that “[s]everal Red Hen 
employees are gay . . . . They knew Sanders had defended Trump’s desire to bar transgender people from 
the military. This month, they had all watched her evade questions and defend a Trump policy that caused 
migrant children to be separated from their parents.” Avi Selk & Sarah Murray, The Owner of the Red 
Hen Explains Why She Asked Sarah Huckabee Sanders to Leave, WASH. POST (June 25, 2018, 5:24 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2018/06/23/why-a-small-town-restaurant-owner-
asked-sarah-huckabee-sanders-to-leave-and-would-do-it-again/. In the restaurant owner’s mind, refusing 
service was a matter of conscientious conviction. It was not however the kind of refusal that would fall 
under the policy as articulated here since Sanders was not seeking the food in the service of the activities 
that the owner opposes. I allow that the principle might receive a broader articulation that would cover 
the Red Hen owner’s refusal, but I do not seek to defend that broader application here. 
191 The language here is loosely based on the test for impermissible sex-based discrimination in 
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996), which forthrightly offers “an asymmetrical anti-
subordination test.” Denise C. Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analysis After United States v. Virginia: 
Evaluating the Constitutionality of K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381, 402 
(1999). The language also echoes the Court’s finding in Brown v. Board of Education that “the policy of 
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group.” 347 U.S. 483, 
494 (1954). For canonical works on anti-subordination, see Fiss, supra note 109, at 157–64; Reva B. 
Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over 
Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472–73 (2004); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, 
Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1058–66 (1986). 
192 Katie Mettler, Why SPLC Says White Lives Matter is a Hate Group but Black Lives Matter is 
Not, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2016, 6:20 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2016/08/31/splc-the-much-cited-designator-of-hate-groups-explains-why-white-lives-matter-
is-one/. 
193 See supra notes 5, 6, and 21 (providing paradigmatic statements of the principle). 
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wedding cake for a religious underage marriage. By contrast, if she refuses 
to participate in the oppression that underage marriage perpetuates, the state 
should grant her an exemption from its anti-discrimination laws, since her 
refusal is consonant with the values underpinning those laws. The fact that 
the vendor routinely sells wedding cakes to couples each of whose members 
is of age is of no moment whatsoever. 
There will of course be difficult cases. May a fabric seller refuse to sell 
black fabric to a Muslim woman who would use it to make a burka?194 May 
a vegan camping store owner refuse to sell a knife to an adherent of Santeria 
who will use the knife in animal sacrifice rituals?195 The difficulty of 
determining whether these cases involve hate of the right kind is akin to the 
difficulty of identifying what counts as hate speech.196 Importantly, though, 
these worries concern the outer bounds of the category of “hate.” The 
concept of hate has a core that is much more ready to hand. I take it to be 
uncontroversial that any activity aimed at denigrating members of a 
protected class so qualifies197 and I intend for the account I have advanced 
to apply to the core cases in the first instance. Clarifying the full scope of 
“hate” will have to wait another day. 
D. The Place of Hate in the State’s Work 
Borrowing from the public rhetoric, I shall call the policy just articulated 
Hate Has No Home Here (HHNHH). That policy allows vendors to refuse 
to contribute their wares to projects that would direct hate to protected 
groups. So far, I have discussed HHNHH as it arises for the private 
enterprise acting in its own right. But what of the state, or private entities 
acting on its behalf? Can the state or its agents deny goods or services to 
 
194 Reasonable minds can of course differ on the question of whether the burka is oppressive. For 
the view that it is, see, for example, Terri Murray, Why Feminists Should Oppose the Burqa, NEW 
HUMANIST (June 26, 2013), https://newhumanist.org.uk/articles/4199/why-feminists-should-oppose-
the-burqa. For the view that it is not, see, for example, Raifa Rafiq, Neither Oppressed Nor Trailblazing, 
Muslim Women Need to Be Heard, GUARDIAN (Mar. 8, 2019, 11:40 AM), https://www.theguardian.co
m/commentisfree/2019/mar/08/muslim-women-representation-media-politics. 
195 Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540–47 (1993) 
(overturning, on First Amendment grounds, a Hialeah ordinance prohibiting the ritual slaughter of 
animals). 
196 See generally Adèle Hutton Auxier, Note, Tiptoeing Through the Junkyard: Three Approaches 
to the Moral Dilemma of Racist Hate Speech, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 215, 221–24 
(2007) (surveying different theories). 
197 More expansively, one could have a policy allowing refusals of service for a set list of hate-
based organizations. I would be prepared to adopt the Southern Poverty Law Center’s list, but others 
might dispute some of its entries. See David Montgomery, The State of Hate, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/wp/2018/11/08/feature/is-the-southern-poverty-law-
center-judging-hate-fairly/ (highlighting the difficulty in defining hate by exploring the different 
viewpoints between SPLC and other organizations on its list of active hate groups). Again, the aim for 
now is not to arrive at a definitive list but to advance the general idea that hate can serve as a permissible 
basis for exclusion, leaving the scope of “hate” for future articulation. 
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those who pursue hate-promoting endeavors? For example, could a foster 
agency refuse to certify the parental fitness of a Christian Identity KKK couple?198 
The answer seems to turn on whether whatever the state or its agent is 
offering is something to which the hate-promoting patron is presumptively 
entitled. On the one hand, we know that the state need not confer benefits on 
hate-based endeavors. Thus, for example, it can deny tax-exempt status to 
entities that engage in invidious discrimination.199 But can it, or its agents, 
deny goods or services to which individuals or entities would otherwise be 
entitled simply on the ground that these individuals or entities promote hate? 
Two lines of precedent suggest that they may not deny these goods and 
services as a categorical matter; on the other hand, a sufficiently compelling 
reason in the face of an individualized assessment could justify the refusal.  
In the first set of cases—relevant to the Fulton context—courts consider 
whether the state or its agents may refuse to certify as foster parents 
individuals who believe that homosexuality or nontraditional gender 
identities are sinful. In Blais v. Hunter, for example, a federal district court 
in Washington suggested that this set of beliefs—even if religiously 
motivated—could disqualify the individuals who hold them.200 But it also 
insisted that holding these beliefs could not function as an automatic bar; 
instead, the disqualification may result only from a strict First Amendment 
balancing test that “tips sharply in . . . favor” of the foster-parent applicant.201  
The second set of cases involves the rights of prison inmates to practice 
white supremacist religions. For a recent example, consider Fox v. 
Washington, a suit brought by two inmates of a Michigan prison who are 
Christian Identity adherents and who challenge the Michigan Department of 
Prison’s refusal to provide them with a dedicated space for their own 
worship services.202 The Department had refused because it had concluded 
that the prisoners’ religious freedom interests could be satisfied were the 
prisoners to attend the religious services of other groups that the prison 
already hosted,203 and it worried that providing a dedicated space for 
Christian Identity worship would pose a security risk at the prison.204 While 
a district court decision upheld the Department’s refusal, the Sixth Circuit 
vacated and remanded because it held that the refusal “substantially 
 
198 Cf. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, No. 19–123; supra Section II.B_. 
199 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding a denial of the 
university’s tax-exempt status because the University prohibits miscegenation, tax exemption should be 
enjoyed only by those entities that serve a public purpose, and an entity that discriminates acts contrary 
to public policy and so cannot be serving a public purpose).  
200 See, e.g., Blais v. Hunter, No. 2:20-cv-00187-SMJ, 2020 WL 5960687, at *12 (E.D. Wa. Oct. 
18, 2020) (“[T]he Court does not enjoin the Department from taking LGBTQ+ considerations into 
account when reviewing foster care license applications.”). 
201 Id. 
202 949 F.3d 279 (6th Cir. 2020). 
203 See id. at 275–76. 
204 Id. 
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burdened” the prisoners’ religious rights.205 Importantly, in arriving at this 
holding, the Sixth Circuit not only recognized that adherents of Christian 
Identity believe in “racial separatism”—its adherents may not worship with 
non-white individuals206—it also relied on that belief to establish that the 
prison’s refusal to allow them to practice apart from non-whites constituted 
a substantial burden. In other words, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the 
refusal to host worship services that the court explicitly recognized as 
“racist”207 could constitute a violation of prisoners’ religious freedom rights.  
Fox v. Washington bestows more deference on the Christian Identity 
adherents than is necessary, or perhaps even permissible.208 The Sixth 
Circuit might have sought to distance itself from the prisoners’ racist 
convictions. Government actors may do so consistent with the tenets of 
liberalism.209 Indeed, it may be that they must disavow racism or other 
invidious forms of discrimination as part and parcel of their obligation to 
secure robust equality for all.210 
It is also worth noting that even while Blais and Fox demonstrate great 
legal deference toward religious convictions that promote hate, that 
deference need not be absolute. In both cases, the government could have 
denied the accommodation so long as it could have proffered a compelling 
reason not to accede, and demonstrated that refusing to accede was the least 
restrictive way to serve that reason.211  
More generally, the distinction between public agencies and private 
commercial entities goes to where the presumption lies, but not ultimately 
to whether each may in some cases refuse service – both may do so. It is just 
that the state or its agents may not adopt categorical rules about whom they 
will or will not serve. Instead, the state or its agents must conduct a searching 
inquiry into whether the party seeking service would in fact promote hate in 
a way that unavoidably interferes with the state’s compelling interest. By 
 
205 Id. at 282. 
206 Id. at 280. 
207 The Sixth Circuit described Christian Identity as “explicitly racist.” Id. at 273. The Southern 
Poverty Law Center has also identified Christian Identity as a racist organization. See supra note 197. 
208 Cf. Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, The Supreme Court Nears the Moment of Truth on Religion, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/27/opinion/supreme-court-religion.html 
(arguing that the Sixth Circuit was compelled by prior mistaken religious freedom cases to rule as it did). 
209 The Court did just this in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 
Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995), when it recognized that anti-discrimination laws were “well within the State's 
usual power to enact when a legislature has reason to believe that a given group is the target of 
discrimination. . . .” Id. at 571–72.   
210 See, e.g., Corey Brettschneider, How Should Liberal Democracies Respond to Faith Based 
Groups That Advocate Discrimination? State Funding and Nonprofit Status, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO 
RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES: ACCOMMODATION AND ITS LIMITS 72, 74–75 (Austin 
Sarat, ed., 2012) (describing “democratic persuasion,” or the state’s responsibility to counter freedom of 
expression with efforts to explain why discriminatory viewpoints “are inconsistent with a respect for free 
and equal citizenship”). Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (“[T]he Gover-
nment has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education. . . .”). 
211 Both cases undertake a strict scrutiny analysis. See Blais v. Hunter, No. 2:20-cv-00187-SMJ, 
2020 WL 5960687, at *10–11 (E.D. Wa. Oct. 18, 2020) ; Fox, 949 F.3d at 282–283. 
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contrast, private businesses may refuse service to anyone involved in a hate-
based project.  
While the HHNHH policy I have advanced cannot, then, operate as 
readily in the domain of public services as in private commerce, the 
government could in some cases refuse to lend its—or the public’s— 
resources to the promotion of hate. And indeed, if the government adopted 
the robust egalitarianism described above, it would see that there is often—
perhaps even always—a compelling reason to refuse to promote hate.212 
IV. VENDOR REFUSALS AND STATE ACTION 
We have just seen that there are limits on the state’s, or its agents’, 
refusal to provide service to individuals or entities where they seek the 
service in question for a project promoting hate. In particular, neither the 
state nor its agents may categorically refuse to provide goods or services on 
the basis of the would-be patron’s protected characteristics, even when those 
characteristics are inextricably bound up with hate-promoting projects (as 
with the adherent of the Christian Identity KKK). At first glance, the 
situation looked to be different for private commercial enterprises that do 
not act as agents of the state. I argued that under HHNHH, a commercial 
vendor could refuse to serve anyone who would use the vendor’s wares in a 
hate-promoting project. Still, one might wonder whether there is problematic 
state action if the state merely permits a private business to, say, turn away 
the Christian Identity KKK patron. Might these refusals involve the state in 
promoting some viewpoints and frustrating others? After all, the state would 
not permit a business to turn away, say, a Christian group seeking goods or 
services for a widely-celebrated Christian holiday (e.g., Christmas, Easter) 
or even a church-specific event that promoted Christianity but did not 
denigrate other religions or groups.  
The problem, generally stated, is this: HHNHH allows messages 
celebrating a protected class but not those denigrating a protected class. In 
that way, it looks perilously similar to the policy the Supreme Court rejected 
in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, where it overturned a St. Paul ordinance 
criminalizing cross burning.213 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, decried 
the ordinance because, by his lights, it discriminated on the basis of 
viewpoint: 
Displays containing some words—odious racial epithets, for 
example—would be prohibited to proponents of all views. But 
“fighting words” that do not themselves invoke race, color, 
creed, religion, or gender—aspersions upon a person’s mother, 
for example—would seemingly be usable ad libitum in the 
 
212 Cf. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity, supra note 57, at 1929 (arguing that courts should 
rarely defer to religious beliefs that would express animus toward protected groups). 
213 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
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placards of those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc., 
tolerance and equality, but could not be used by those 
speakers’ opponents. One could hold up a sign saying, for 
example, that all “anti-Catholic bigots” are misbegotten; but 
not that all “papists” are . . . .214  
The passage advances two different complaints about the ordinance. The 
first two quoted sentences rail against a policy that would condemn people 
on the basis of protected characteristics but not on other grounds that might 
be just as hurtful (e.g., inveighing against the target’s mother). That is a real 
distinction though not an embarrassing one, once one appreciates that 
protected characteristics are protected precisely because of their 
subordinating social meaning.215 (And at any rate, virtually everyone has a 
mother, putting all of the fighting firebrands on equal footing.)  
The Court’s second complaint is that the St. Paul ordinance would 
permit signs condemning “anti-Catholic bigots” but not “papists.” Here too 
the distinction is real but defensible as a moral matter (even if not as a 
constitutional matter). There is a moral difference between speakers  bent on 
bigotry (the anti-Catholics are “bigots”) and those engaging in benign 
religious devotion (the “papists”). Justice Scalia needed to argue that the 
ordinance would condemn anti-Catholic bigots but not, e.g., anti-Protestant 
bigots to make his point that the ordinance engaged in morally problematic 
viewpoint discrimination. And, importantly, the HHNHH policy does not 
produce that form of discrimination as it allows businesses to turn away 
bigots of any stripe.216  
Yet even if HHNHH’s asymmetries can be defended on moral grounds, 
R.A.V. still evokes a constitutional worry. That worry takes two forms: First, 
does the First Amendment allow the state to enshrine a policy that treats 
projects promoting hate differently from those promoting toleration (e.g., 
allowing businesses to turn away anti-gay commissions but not gay-activist 
commissions)? Second, even if the state may do so, is the state 
 
214 Id. at 391–92. 
215 See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.  
216 In dissent, Justice Stevens aims to attack Justice Scalia’s on different grounds.  
The response to a sign saying that “all [religious] bigots are misbegotten” is a sign 
saying that “all advocates of religious tolerance are misbegotten.” Assuming such 
signs could be fighting words (which seems to me extremely unlikely), neither sign 
would be banned by the ordinance, for the attacks were not “based on . . . religion” 
but rather on one’s beliefs about tolerance. 
Id. at 435 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (alterations in original). Justice Stevens has 
unhelpfully changed the hypothetical. For one thing, he is right that neither of his signs contains fighting 
words and indeed both should be permitted. For another, Justice Stevens has not made the epithets 
specific to a particular protected group and it was the ordinance’s differential treatment of protected 
groups that led to its infirmity. Indeed, that is the right way to see the problem with the ordinance—not 
as viewpoint discrimination but as an equality violation.  
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constitutionally empowered to determine what counts as “hate”? I 
address each worry in turn. 
On the policy advocated here, the state may permit storeowners to turn 
away those with supremacist messages (i.e., “we’re-better-than-you”) but 
not those with equality-insisting messages (i.e., “we’re-just-as-good-as-you”). 
But that differential treatment is precisely what rendered the ordinance in 
R.A.V. constitutionally infirm. To motivate the worry, imagine that a 
Christian Identity KKK member seeks the services of a photocopy shop for 
purposes of producing leaflets he will distribute at a white supremacist rally. 
If viewpoint discrimination is an issue at all, it will be much more acute 
where the requested good involves printed words rather than a generic 
product, like an unadorned cake. If the state protects the shop owner’s right 
to refuse service, would this count as an undue state restriction on speech? 
To be sure, the state is not prohibiting the white supremacist speech. Nor 
is the state mandating that printing shops refuse to publish white supremacist 
speech. Nor, finally, is the state preferring the printer’s message over the 
white supremacist’s. The printer is not disseminating any message in 
refusing service. No one other than the customer need know the grounds of 
her refusal, or even that she refused service in the first place.217  
But one might still worry that state action sustaining the rights of 
printing shops to refuse service because the printed material would express 
a particular set of viewpoints constitutes an impermissible restriction on 
speech. The state appears to be acting in a way that impairs dissemination of 
some viewpoints but not others—assuming, for example, that the printer 
could not refuse service to a Black advocacy or gay Pride group.218  
Does the state impermissibly favor the printer’s anti-white supremacy 
stance in finding that the printer has permissibly refused service? I do not 
think so. The state sustains the printer’s right to withhold her energies from 
promoting hate, but it does not do so because of the particular brand of hate 
the printer refuses to serve. So long as the state would have been just as 
willing to sustain the rights of a printer to withhold printing services from, 
say, a Black supremacist group, then it does not act in order to promote or 
impede particular viewpoints. 
Still, in virtue of permitting printers to turn anyone away on ideological 
grounds, one might worry that the state is limiting the diversity of views 
made available for others’ consideration.219 A few thoughts in response. 
 
217 Cf. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–10 (1974) (identifying among the criteria for 
something to count as speech that its message be readily discernable by an audience). 
218 I take it that neither of these operates with a supremacist ideology—i.e., each seeks to affirm its 
equal, not superior, moral worth relative to all others. 
219 Cf. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 STAN. 
L. REV. 1919, 1940 (2006) (“One may also argue that the government must treat all viewpoints as equal 
in the eyes of the law, at least where private speech . . . is involved, because the government must remain 
subservient to, rather than dominant over, public opinion.”); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 
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First, if this is a genuine and widely felt concern, citizens of the state can 
advocate to have “ideology” included as one of the categories that the state’s 
public accommodations laws specifically protect.220 Second, even if the 
effect of these refusals is to reduce the variety of views citizens encounter,221 
one could deny that state action produced this reduction in just the same way 
that the Court denies that there is state action in, say, school voucher cases.222 
There, the claim is that the state does not impermissibly support religion 
even if it permits parents to use vouchers for religious school tuition since it 
is the parents themselves who have chosen the place of education for their 
children.223 By the same token, one could claim here that the state does not 
impermissibly restrict the number of ideological views on offer or the 
relative prominence of those views since it is the printers themselves who 
choose which views they will or will not publish. 
So the state may in principle sustain vendors’ rights to refuse to 
contribute to hate-promoting projects and its doing so need not constitute 
state action. A second worry remains, however, insofar as HHNHH allows 
the state to determine what counts as hate.224 There could indeed be 
something troubling about having the state engage in these kinds of 
determinations. As the Court rightly found in Masterpiece, whether a vendor 
permissibly turns someone away “cannot be based on the government’s own 
assessment of offensiveness.”225 But I suspect that there is a meaningful 
difference between offensiveness and hate, as the latter is defined here. An 
offensiveness determination is unavoidably subjective—something is 
offensive just if it gives offense, which is to say, just if an audience finds it 
to be offensive.226 On the other hand, a determination that some activity 
asserts or perpetuates the inferior status of a protected group, which is what 
 
U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (“[P]rivate conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal 
Protection Clause unless to some significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been found 
to have become involved in it.”).  
220 Seattle’s public accommodations ordinance does just this. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
221 The possibility that the variety of views on offer might be diminished was far more plausible in, 
for example, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, where the Court had to contend with the scarce resource 
of broadcast frequencies. 395 U.S. 367, 369–72 (1969). By contrast, the prospect of diminished access 
to particular viewpoints from a policy that permits printing shop owners to deny service on non-identity 
based grounds seems far more unlikely today, where social media can accommodate all speakers. 
222 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652–53 (2002) (finding that the state 
program at issue was “neutral in all respects toward religion” and “a program of true private choice”). 
223 Id. at 652 (“A program that shares these features permits government aid to reach religious 
institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients.”). 
224 I acknowledge this difficulty above. See supra text accompanying notes 194–97. 
225 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731 (2018). 
226 Cf. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1749 (2017) (“The disparagement clause denies registration 
to any mark that is offensive to a substantial percentage of the members of any group. That is viewpoint 
discrimination in the sense relevant here: Giving offense is a viewpoint.”). 
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HHNHH contemplates,227 need not be subjective. After all, hate crimes laws 
are formulated to target just this kind of activity.228 
In sum, there would be no problematic state action where the state 
allowed private enterprises to deny service for projects that promoted hate 
because the decision to turn the patron away would rest with the enterprise 
alone. Nor need the state engage in problematic viewpoint discrimination in 
defining “hate” for HHNHH; that definition could just be the one used in 
hate crimes laws across the country.  
CONCLUSION 
On the proposal that I have been advancing, public accommodations 
may not refuse service to individuals because of their protected 
characteristics, no matter the assault on conscience that compelled service 
might wage. With that said, and consistent with the sympathetic construction 
of complicity and the conscientious model I offered in Part I, vendors need 
not support others’ hate-promoting projects, even if those projects are rooted 
in the values or activities or commitments of protected groups. 
I have aimed to argue that there is in fact no conflict between equality 
and refusing service to those who seek a vendor’s products for hateful ends. 
Those ends are themselves equality-undermining, so, if anything, vendors 
vindicate equality when they refuse to contribute to them. I want to end by 
considering how we might treat vendors with conscientious objections to 
non-hate-based projects, and to suggest that we offer them more compassion 
than advocates of Equal Access might support.  
Here is the general thought: public accommodation laws confer a 
rhetorical advantage on the customers they protect. These customers cannot 
be ejected from a place of business simply on the basis of their possessing a 
protected characteristic. Privileged to stay, they might as well engage in a 
civil dialogue with the owner who would otherwise turn them away. 
Hopefully these dialogues would produce a compromise; at the very least, 
they might humanize the parties on each side. To be sure, the customer 
always retains the power to compel service or else file a legal complaint. But 
the customer’s power to hold the vendor to the vendor’s legal obligations 
should function as a backstop. There is much more to be gained from 
compassionate engagement than civil rights bullying.229 And the market, far 
from being a sphere reduced to profit and profanity, might just be a place 
where conscience, compassion, and civil rights can all prosper. 
 
227 See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
228 See id. 
229 Cf. Colleen Shalby, Winery That Refused To Hold a Wedding for Same-Sex Couple Reverses Course 
Following Criticism, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2019, 3:44 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/201
9-09-13/winery-told-same-sex-couple-they-couldnt-have-wedding-at-venue-reverses-course-following-
criticism (describing how a California winery that initially refused to hold a same-sex wedding at its venue 
reversed course, and issued an apology for causing “anyone pain,” in the face of social media pressure). 
 
 
